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Kurzfassung
Kommunale Weidewirtschaftsformen in semi-ariden Gebieten sind komplexe 
sozial-ökologische Systeme (SÖS). Ihre Komplexität ist in nicht-linearen 
Rückkoppelungsschleifen zwischen dem Sozial- und dem Ökosystem begründet. 
Die Untersuchung des sozialen Systems beinhaltet institutionelle Fragen bezüglich 
des Ökosystemmanagements von Allmendegütern. Darüber hinaus ist die hohe 
klimatische Variabilität in semi-ariden Gebieten für die Einschätzung von 
Ökosystemdynamiken zu berücksichtigen.
Die vorliegende Dissertation quantifiziert die Dynamiken eines kommunalen, 
Viehproduktions-SÖS in einem ehemaligen „Homeland“ in Südafrika. In diesem 
Zusammenhang wurde ein soziales, agentenbasiertes Modell mit einem 
Biomassewachstumsmodell des Weidelandes gekoppelt. Die Koppelung der 
Modelle wurde durch eine vollständige Softwareintegration (Java) erreicht. Somit 
berücksichtigt das Gesamtmodel ökologische Komplexität. Letzteres stellt einen 
Beitrag zur methodologischen Verbesserung von bio-ökonomischen Modellen dar 
insofern als das jene ökologische Prozesse stark vereinfachen.  Das SÖS-Modell 
basiert auf primären Fallstudiendaten.
Auf einer konzeptuellen Ebene untersuchen die drei Hauptkapitel dieser 
Dissertation die Aspekte von SÖS Resilienz, Kollaps und Reorganisation. Im 
Einzelnen untersucht das zweite Kapitel soziale Wohlfahrtsimplikationen einer 
(Wieder)-Einführung von Herdengrößenmanagement sowie von räumlich-
zeitlichen Weidemustern. Das dritte Kapitel beschäftigt sich mit den Effekten einer 
lokalen Norm auf SÖS-Dynamiken hinsichtlich Kollaps versus Stabilität. Die 
Messung der Resilienz auf verschiedenen Skalen des SÖS – bezüglich 
Dürreperioden, einem Verlust an sozialer Verflechtung sowie einer signifikanten 
Veränderung der Subventionen – steht im Mittelpunkt des vierten Kapitels.  
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Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Anpassung der Herdengröße höhere soziale 
Wohlfahrtsgewinne erzielt als die Einführung von Wechselweidewirtschaft. Dieses 
Ergebnis wurde unter der Annahme eines institutionellen Vakuums im SÖS erzielt. 
In einem zweiten Schritt wurde die Existenz einer informellen Institution, welche 
die Herdengröße endogen aber indirekt beeinflusst, festgestellt. Modellergebnisse 
zeigen den signifikanten Einfluss jener informellen Institution auf die 
Langzeitstabilität des SÖS insofern als dass sie die Wahrscheinlichkeit für einen 
Systemkollaps senkt. Die Emergenz von normgeleitetem Verhalten wurde durch 
Ökosystemvariabilität gefördert. Das SÖS war resilient gegenüber Dürren und 
einer Veränderung der Subventionen. Es war allerdings nicht resilient gegenüber 
dem Verlust an sozialer Verflechtung. Von den drei behandelten Szenarien 
verhinderte nur die Einführung eines bedingungsloses Grundeinkommen einen
Strukturwandel mit erodierender Resilienz der Haushalten. Die Einführung eines 
bedingungslosen Grundeinkommens ermöglichte es ärmeren Haushalten sich 
erfolgreich im Wettbewerb um die Ressourcenutzung zu behaupten, ohne jedoch 
die Resilienz des gekoppelten Systems zu gefährden. 
Schlüsselwörter: Süd Afrika, Weideland, Allmende, Sozial-ökologisches System, 
Agenten-basierte Modellierung, Resilienz, Endogene Modellierung von 
Instutionen, Normen
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Abstract
Communal rangelands in semi-arid areas are complex socio-ecological systems 
(SES). Their complexity arises from non-linear feedbacks between the social- and 
the ecosystem. To understand the social system requires tackling institutional 
issues associated with common pool resource governance. Moreover, assessing 
ecosystem dynamics commands to acknowledge high climatic variability in semi-
arid areas. 
This thesis quantifies the dynamics of a communal livestock production SES in a 
former homeland of South Africa using a SES modelling approach. Here, a social 
agent based model is combined with a biomass growth model of the rangeland. The 
coupling of both models is achieved by full integration on software (Java) level.  
Accordingly, the resulting model does account for ecological complexity. The 
latter constitutes a contribution to the methodological advancement of bio-
economic modelling insofar as bio-economic models strongly simplify ecological 
processes. The SES model is specified based on primary data from a case study.
On a conceptual level, the three main chapters in this thesis investigate aspects of 
SES resilience, collapse and reorganization. Specifically, chapter two assesses 
social welfare impacts from reorganizing resource use by the adjustment of 
stocking rates and alterations of spatio-temporal grazing patterns. Chapter 3 
explores the effect of a local norm on SES dynamics with a focus on collapse vs. 
stability. Finally, chapter 4 quantifies the resilience on multiple scales of the SES 
towards droughts, a loss of social embededdness and a significant change in 
subsidization. 
We found that the adjustment of stocking rates yields higher social benefits 
compared to the (re)-introduction of rotational grazing in a system assumed to be 
void of institutional arrangements. In a second step, we identified the existence of a 
- v-
local norm indirectly impacting resource use by endogenous stocking rate 
adjustments.  The existence of the informal institution significantly contributes to 
the long-term stability of the SES by reducing the chance for collapse. The 
emergence of norm-following behaviour is fostered by climatic variability. The 
SES was resilient towards droughts and a change in subsidization. It was however 
not resilient towards a loss in social embededdness. At another level, only the
introduction of a basic income grant was able to stop a process of structural change 
eroding household resilience. The introduction of a basic income grant enabled 
poorer households to successfully compete with richer ones without jeopardizing 
the resilience of the coupled system. 
Keywords: South Africa, Common-pool resource, Socio-ecological system, Agent 
based modelling, Resilience, Modelling of endogenous institutions, Norms
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1Chapter 1
Research Context
1.1 Motivation and structure
The sub-Saharan African rangeland commons are a vital contributor to income 
diversification (Berzborn 2007) and livestock serves as a safety-net (Vetter 2009). 
Apartheid's legacy and the socio-economic framework sets South Africa apart 
from its neighbours with respect to the social determinants of resource 
appropriation from rangelands. Massive resettlement programs targeted at the 
black population resulted in the creation of so-called “homelands”. Grazing land 
was assigned to individual settlements in those overcrowded reserves in order to 
provide a means for subsistence farming on a common-pool resource basis. Over 
decades, the management of the rangeland commons, including the constitution of 
institutions of resource governance, was top-down and coined by external 
intervention (Naumann 2014). The fall of apartheid resulted in a sudden 
dismantlement of formal institutions of resource use. At the same time, large scale 
and state backed financial assistance payments were introduced.  The combination 
of small resource sizes, a decade long crowding out of intrinsic motivation 
together with the introduction of age-coupled social grants created a unique 
situation in those rangeland commons. Today, “livestock presents the largest 
monetary investment in agricultural assets in the former homelands” (Vetter 2013, 
p.1).
The empirical case investigated for this thesis is the village community of Sediba 
in rural Thaba Nchu, South Africa. Sediba is medium sized with 162 households 
(HH) of which 80 are producing livestock. Income is mainly generated by state 
grants. Livestock is kept either as a means of savings, sold for unforeseen 
expenses or is slaughtered during funerals. It furthermore serves as a status 
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symbol. The share of agricultural profit relative to total income is small but the 
capital bound in livestock constitutes a major monetary resource for HH. Sediba's 
residents utilize a 2500 ha large rangeland for grazing. Beef cattle are the 
dominant grazers. Only residents from the village are entitled with access rights to 
the rangeland. This does not, however, exclude absentee herding. 
This thesis goes beyond the socio-economic assessment of the described case as it 
analyses the dynamic interaction between the social and the ecosystem. The 
underlying scientific paradigm for the presented research is the notion of coupled 
socio-ecological systems (SES) as “rangelands are closely linked SES” (Gross et 
al. 2006, p.1265). Acknowledging the coupled nature of both systems introduces 
additional complexity arising from reciprocal feedbacks and non-linear dynamics 
(Liu et al. 2007). According to Vetter (2009), agricultural research has „generally 
remained focused on sustainable yields and reducing the effects of environmental  
variability, and agricultural policies and interventions in South Africa still lack an 
integrated approach which incorporates ecological and social dimensions of 
rangelands use” (Vetter 2009, p.32). To contribute to an integrated approach for a 
holistic investigation of rangelands was the overarching motivation for this thesis. 
In rangeland systems, individual actions interact with resource dynamics (Milner-
Gulland et al. 2006, p.24). The interaction of ecological with social processes 
leads to emergent properties, e.g. resilience, on system level. Such emergent 
outcomes in SES are path-dependent (Schlüter et al. 2012). Moreover, Gross et al. 
(2006) found that the interaction of the social- with the ecological domain 
introduces thresholds in addition to those already existent in the ecosystem. A 
central hypothesis for this thesis is that the complementary view to the latter 
statement is likewise valid. That is, socio-ecological interactions add thresholds to 
social dynamics. 
The three chapters in this paper are dissecting the complexity of the SES in an 
iterative approach by investigating the effect of ecological (chapter 2), social 
(chapter 3) and socio-ecological thresholds (chapter 4).  
There is an additional, more theoretical, distinction reflected by the structure of 
this thesis. A canonical framework for describing the dynamics of SES is the 
adaptive renewal management cycle by Holling (1986). Holling created the notion 
of dynamic feedbacks of human-nature coupled systems contrasting the 
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command-and-control paradigm of maximal sustainable yield. According to the 
adaptive cycle, every SES passes four distinct phases in an infinitive loop. 
Forward dynamics within that cycle are constituted by the movement of SES from 
growth to conservation. The first phase of exploitation (r) is characterized by an 
abundance of resources, increasing appropriation and few connections between 
system elements. As the utilization of ecosystem services increases, growth slows 
down and structures are solidified in the conservation phase (K). More capital is 
needed to maintain the structure and the whole system becomes more vulnerable 
to external disturbances. Shocks are more likely to propagate in a highly 
connected socio-ecological network. Surprise is what shifts the system from the 
forward dynamics into the backloop. That is, disturbances lead to a disconnection 
RIV\VWHPHOHPHQWVLQWKHUHOHDVHSKDVHȍ%RXQGHGFDSLWDOLVUHOHDVHGIURPWKH
disintegrating structure and reused by institutions coping with change in the 
UHRUJDQL]DWLRQ SKDVH Į :DONHU HW DO  $ FULWLFDO HOHPHQW ZLWKLQ WKLV
EDFNORRS G\QDPLFV IURP ȍ WR Į LV HPERGLHG LQ WKH DYDLODELOLW\ RI DGDSWLYH
capacity. Adaptive capacity is the ability of the system to incorporate or absorb 
disturbances. Viewed from the social perspective, adaptive capacity is present in 
the process of institutional (re)invention or innovation (Berkes et al. 2003).
Recent work on SESs attempts to operationalize the meta-model of the adaptive 
cycle such that it can be better used in disciplinary approaches and theories. E.g. 
Abel et al. (2006) equate adaptive capacity with forms of capital linking
disciplines like ecology, economics and sociology.  They also identify complex 
adaptive systems (CAS) theory as a:
“ […] strong foundation for understanding change in SESs, in particular in its 
recognition of self-organisation and non-linear change” (Abel et al. 2006)
However, processes of self-organization and non-linear change are not as well 
understood as the development phases of the for-loop of SESs (r,K) (Walker et al. 
2002; Walker et al. 2006). Moreover, Cumming and Collier (2005) remind us to 
look for SESs which deviate from the adaptive cycle. In fact, deviations are 
becoming evident by recent empirical research on SESs (Anderies et al. 2006). 
In Summary, the adaptive cycle is an idealized process elaborating the concepts of 
resilience, collapse and reorganization based upon the adaptive capacity of its 
sub-systems in a sequential manner. That is, SESs are assumed to be resilient 
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towards change until collapse occurs which is followed by reorganization in an 
infinite loop1. However, the order of phases is case specific and difficult to project 
in its entirety. The latter becomes, at least in our view, infeasible when the aim is 
to quantify the dynamics over time. 
Generally, this thesis focuses on each of the three named concepts in its separate 
chapters albeit acknowledging the linkage to the other two. The three main 
chapters are dedicated to reorganization, collapse and resilience analyzed through 
the lens of CAS. In CAS, highly non-linear dynamic processes connected over 
different scales are triggered by perturbations resulting in cascading effects if 
system inherent thresholds of change are crossed. New cascading effects can only 
occur if a certain degree of connectivity is re-established by the self-organizing 
property of the complex system (Abel et al. 2006).
Contrary to the adaptive cycle, we don’t imply a sequence of events rather than 
analyzing the mutual impacts of resilience, collapse and reorganization. Thus, we 
avoid assuming fixed temporal trajectories in favour for casual interdependence 
and their potential consequences. This is done by acknowledging ecosystem 
resilience and SES collapse in the assessment of reorganizing resource use 
(chapter 2), by analyzing the role of multiple stable social states and institutional 
evolution in mitigating collapse (chapter 3) and in quantifying multi-scale 
resilience by measuring systemic change impacted by the infusion and reduction 
of economic and social capital, respectively (chapter 4). The general research 
questions answered by the three chapters are:
1. What are the effects of management changes in spatiotemporal grazing 
and stocking rates on agricultural profits, economic variability, equity and 
ecosystem resilience?
2. What is the effect of a "resource-blind" social norm on SES stability vs. 
collapse and how does norm guided behaviour evolve?
3. How resilient are the different scales of the SES towards bio-physical and 
socio-economic shocks?
1 We use the term “collapse” in the sense of “release” as previously done by Abel et al. (2006)
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1.2 The approach – SES modelling
We approached these research questions by empirically based SES modelling
with the aim to arrive at quantifiable measures.  SES modelling differs from 
traditional, disciplinary approaches by explicitly taking the coupling of the 
ecosystem with the social system into account, and by acknowledging the 
complexity of the overall system. According to Schlüter et al. (2012), traditional 
ecosystem models treat the social realm as exogenous whereas bio-economic 
models endogenize the actions of resource users. In bio-economic models rational 
actors are maximizing utility under resource constraints, but "[...] diverse actors of 
the social system are not considered and resource dynamics are generally very 
simple" (Schlüter et al. 2012, p.224). SES models, however, account for 
heterogeneous decision making and rich ecological dynamics. In SESs, “slowly 
evolving institutional rules and infrastructure systems interact with faster resource 
dynamics and even faster economic decisions” (Schlüter et al. 2012, p.248).
Ecological modelling as part of SES modelling has reached some maturity during 
the last decades, but social models accounting for heterogeneity of agents are still 
in need of further development. SES modelling attempts are increasingly focusing 
on human behaviour e.g. (Smajgl et al. 2010; McAllister et al. 2011). Actors in 
SES models are considered boundedly rational in contrast to the assumption of a 
homo oecononomicus underlying traditional bio-economic models (Carpenter and 
Brock 2004; Ebenhöh and Pahl-Wostl 2008; Feola and Binder 2010; Heckbert et 
al. 2010; Schlüter and Pahl-Wostl 2007; Janssen and Ostrom 2006; Sun and 
Müller 2013), who thinks too much compared the thoughtless efficiency of 
heuristic decision making and norm guided behaviour (Epstein 2006, p.226). 
Moreover, conceptual and computational models of collective action are likewise 
deviating from the assumption of rational egoism in common pool settings 
(Ostrom 2003; 2005; Deadman 1999; Ebenhöh 2006). Ostrom (2005) stresses the 
important role of non-monetary incentives like normative sanctioning for 
successful common-pool resource governance – i.e. for avoiding a tragedy of the 
commons described in Hardin (1968). Most social models incorporating bounded 
rationality are agent based models (ABMs). 
The term ABM describes a set of social simulation modelling approaches which 
share a common paradigm. That is, agent-based modelling is "bottom-up" by 
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"growing" the social phenomena under investigation. Epstein termed this 
approach generative social science (2006). ABMs avoid the "top-down" approach 
of traditional (bio)-economic simulation models. That is, without relying on a
unified objective function and restricting equilibrium constraints2, ABMs generate 
emergent outcomes from local interactions of heterogeneous agents. Such 
emergent outcomes on system level might be dynamic patterns, distributions or 
multiple stable states. Moreover, ABMs are capable to capture the non-linear 
nature of SESs. They generate path-dependent outcomes as they are explicitly 
dynamic and adaptive. That latter allows for second-order emergence or 
immergence. That is, the emergent properties are immerging back into the local 
interactions in a path-dependent manner. Moreover, the non-aggregate nature of 
ABMs allows incorporating qualitative relationships into the quantitative 
framework. Decision making in ABMs can follow any paradigm but allows for 
relaxing rationality assumptions which is a common approach.
Accordingly, the social sub-models presented in this thesis are ABMs and their 
design is guided by the principles of bounded rationality. Agents use heuristic 
rules for livestock production (chapters 2-4) and for those decisions impacting 
collective action (chapters 3 and 4). Agents are heterogeneous with respect to 
decision making rules and parameters. They interact indirectly via resource 
appropriation (chapters 2-4) and directly via normative sanctioning (chapters 3 
and 4). The models are coded in Java using the Repast framework (North et al. 
2013) and utilize a learning classifier library (Hufschlag 2010). The ABMs
contain a re-implementation of a livestock model by Gross et al. (2006).
The ecological sub-model was designed by crop scientists at the University of 
Bonn3 (forthcoming). The biomass growth model accounts for high climatic 
variability symptomatic for the study region by means of a high temporal solution 
(daily). It is written in the Scala programming language under the Simplace 
framework (http://www.simplace.net/). Both sub-models, including the Simplace 
2 Kuhn et al. 2014 is a recent exception to this definition as their approach allows for heterogeneous 
agents embedded in the toolset of equilibrium modeling
3 http://www.lap.uni-bonn.de/home?set_language=en
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framework, are fully integrated in Repast. That is, the SES model is dynamically 
exchanging data between its components during any model run.
The reference frame MORE (modelling for resilience thinking and ecosystem 
stewardship) offers a conceptual framework for classifying SES models with 
regard to three objectives (Schlüter et al. 2013). Accordingly, SES models can 
either contribute to the elucidation of societal strategies (participatory modelling), 
to the advancement of theory (generic models) or deliver insights in the structure 
of real-world cases (structural realistic modelling). Toy modelling serves a cross-
cutting objective (Figure 1.1). The three objectives are not mutual exclusive rather 
than informing each other. The SES model designed for this thesis can be 
categorized as a structurally realistic model. However, in chapter three, a generic 
model by (Ebenhöh and Pahl-Wostl 2008) was adapted to the case and integrated 
in the SES model. 
Figure 1.1 Reference frame MORE (Modelling for Resilience Thinking and 
Ecosystem Stewardship) (Schlüter et al. 2013)
The SES model here explores resilience mechanisms, investigates dynamics over 
socio-ecological scales and builds upon a theory of bounded rationality and 
collective action. The structure of the model is informed by empirical case study 
data collected from 2010 until 2013 in several villages of rural Thaba Nchu, 
South Africa. A team of crop and soil scientists, economists and anthropologists 
8 1.2 The approach – SES modelling
conducted field research funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG)4. 
This included soil and vegetation sampling, surveys and qualitative research. A 
living standard and measurement survey (Worldbank) was adapted and conducted 
with the specific aim of SES modelling in mind. The same accounts for 
vegetation and soil sampling. Anthropologist’s field observations supported 
modelling by face validation of stylized social values and processes. 
The three main chapters of this thesis are supplemented by an extensive online 
appendix (http://www.ilr.uni-bonn.de/agpo/publ/techpap/Techpap15-01.pdf)
containing model descriptions according to the ODD+D protocol for describing 
human behaviour in agent based models (Müller et al. 2013). Being a 
standardized protocol for model description, the ODD+D protocol aims to 
enhance model replicability and comparability with a focus on decision making. 
The contents of the ODD+D protocols are somewhat redundant owed to the re-
use of larger model parts when moving from chapter to chapter. We opted to not 
rephrase reoccurring paragraphs as the ODD+D is meant to be a technical model 
description only complimented with the theoretical and empirical justification of 
model assumptions. Chapter 2 and 3 contain excerpts from the respective 
ODD+D protocol. That is, the two chapters contain the overview and design 
concept elements from the protocol. To exclude the details part of the protocol 
from research manuscripts was also recommended by the authors of the ODD+D 
protocol. In chapter 4, only changes to the previous model are mentioned5 in 
favour of readability. 
4 DFG Research Group FOR 1501, Grant nr. HE 2854/3-1
5 Ideally, also chapter 3 should only contain changes to the previous model. However, we included 
the excerpts from the ODD+D protocol in the third chapter due to the sequence in the publication 
process. That is, the third chapter represents an accepted paper in Environmental Modelling & 
Software (Rasch et al. 2014). We apologize for the resulting redundancy in model descriptions in 
the first two chapters.
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This section summarizes the three main chapters of the dissertation. It 
furthermore elaborates on the model set-ups from a complex adaptive system 
perspective and relates findings and limitations to the progressive sequence of 
chapters. The distinct roles of resilience, collapse and reorganization are 
highlighted and put into a joint perspective.
1.3.1 Reorganizing resource use in a communal livestock production SES in 
South Africa
The second chapter lays out the computational foundation for the quantitative 
analysis of the coupled system by presenting a fully integrated SES model.  It 
furthermore investigates pathways for reorganizing the SES. An earlier version
was presented at the Resilience & Development Conference 2014 in Montpellier. 
Reorganization of formal institutions of livestock related resource use has not yet 
happened two decades after the fall of apartheid (Naumann 2014). The social 
system resides in a state of institutional collapse with respect to formal rules-in-
use. The only exceptions are access rules preventing the transformation of the 
common-pool to an open-access good. We lack the relevant theories and 
empirical ground to model the process of endogenous institutional innovation for 
this case. However, quantitative data regarding the acceptance and expectation for 
two relevant institutional reorganizations were gathered. These were the (re)-
introduction of (1) rotational grazing rules and (2) of a rule determining a 
maximum cap on herd sizes per HH. 
Rotational grazing and maximum stocking rates relate to two scientific
discourses. First, to the debate regarding equilibrium vs. non-equilibrium theory 
in rangeland science (Briske et al. 2003). Second, to the dichotomy between 
engineering and ecological resilience (Peterson et al. 1998; Vetter 2009). 
Equilibrium theory suggests maximum stocking rates below a (static) grazing 
capacity. Contrary, the non-equilibrium paradigm emphasizes opportunistic
stocking in order to maximize production in rainy periods. The dichotomy of 
resilience concepts does not relate to straight-forward management advices. 
However, the assumptions of stable alternative states made in the ecological
resilience concept depict an irreversible transition to degradation if the resource is 
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not properly rested (e.g. done in rest rotation schemes). The latter is only valid for 
un-resilient ecosystems. The investigation of social welfare benefits in resilient 
ecosystems might well benefit from the concept of return time which is a feature 
of engineering resilience. That is, continuous grazing might be superior under 
certain circumstances. It is the latter notion of case specificity which informed the 
approach in the second chapter. That is, the chapter makes an attempt to 
overcome the dichotomy in concepts in the rangeland literature by following 
Campbell et al.'s suggestion that ”one size does not fit all” (2006, p.81). 
The chapter analyses social welfare effects under the consideration of ecosystem 
resilience with respect to alternative grazing strategies (Vetter 2013). We found 
that the ecosystem is highly resilient (Moreno García et al. 2014). We utilized the 
concept of resistance and return time in order measure the degree of ecosystem 
resilience which is highly relevant from a management perspective (Ruppert et al. 
2014). The analysis in chapter 2 is based on the assumption that agents fully 
conform to institutional prescriptions or prohibitions. Here, we modelled the 
combinations of opportunistic vs. conservative stocking with rotational vs. 
continuous grazing in a baseline and three alternative scenarios. We related the 
socio-ecological outcomes of reorganization to participant acceptance and 
expectation and discussed the likelihood of reorganization in that light. 
Our findings suggest that all three management alternatives to the status quo 
increase ecosystem resilience preventing SES collapse and decrease economic 
variability. The most beneficial strategy is conservative stocking under 
continuous grazing as it additionally increases profitability and equity. This 
outcome constitutes a border case between what is typically recommended for
temperate and semi-arid zones. That is, either rotational grazing and conservative 
stocking (temperate) or continuous grazing and opportunistic stocking6 (semi-
arid) is suggested.
The results arising from the introduction of formal rules are contrasting 
participant acceptance and expectation. That is, villagers expect a significant 
increase in animal productivity from rotational grazing. Such (over)-expectations 
6 According to the new Rangeland science paradigm 
1.3 Contribution 11
were also noted by Briske et al. (2008). Our results do likewise not support the 
assumption of increased animal production. This questions the long term 
conformity of participants towards rotational grazing rules and their commitment 
in the maintenance of the needed infrastructure. Moreover, a formal rule 
enforcing a maximum herd size per HH is not welcomed as participants had bad 
experiences with the enforcement of that rule under the apartheid regime (Jacobs 
2001). Future research might investigate the impacts of monitoring grazing 
pressure and ecosystem state combined with buying support for animals during 
the advance of ecological crisis (Scoones und Graham 1994). Contrary to current 
unintended resting, such a "tight tracking" for emergency sales has the potential to 
avoid severe losses of the capital bound up in livestock (Campbell et al. 2006). 
The modelling approach in the second chapter favoured model transparency and 
communication. However, it is limited in two ways: First, it only allowed for the 
evaluation of formal rules. Second, it assumed full conformity of agents. From a 
complex adaptive systems perspective, the scenarios of management alternatives 
(social determinants) change thresholds in the ecosystem. However, the 
introduced social rules are not adaptive and thus do not lead to a second-order 
emergence into the social sphere. An adaptive institution is in the focus of the 
third chapter. Interviews with stakeholders, anthropologic field observation as 
well as the relative egalitarian herd structure indicated the existence of an 
informal institution; a norm impacting resource utilization. 
1.3.2 Collapse and cooperation in a communal livestock production SES model 
- a case from South Africa
The third chapter is a published paper in Environmental Modelling & Software
and extends the approach in chapter two by modelling the endogenous emergence 
of cooperation due to the interaction of agents wavering between cooperation and 
defection in the context of a local norm (Rasch et al. 2014). Computational 
modelling of norms and institutional evolution has been applied in generic, or 
theory based models in the past; e.g. (Staller and Petta 2001; Saam and Harrer 
1999; Smajgl et al. 2010; Thebaud and Locatelli 2001).  A rare exception is 
Wilson et al. who used real-world case study data from a lobster fishery case in 
Maine to show the self-organizing property of collective action (2007).
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The generic approach is based on Ebenhöh and Pahl-Wostl (2008) who presented 
a computational implementation of Ostrom’s theory of collective action (2003). 
They successfully replicated results from economic experiments. Its adaption is 
constituted by the application to a local norm, by coupling it to SES dynamics and 
by using empirical data for the agent attributes of cooperativeness and reciprocity. 
We furthermore introduce the concepts of vividness and severity of norm 
violations in the computational model. 
Agents defect or cooperate with respect to an action prescribed by a norm and the 
normative sanctioning of norm violators. Here, a simple norm to "not have much 
more cattle than others" is enforced by normative sanctioning. That is, no formal 
punishment rather than the disapproval by others is what's driving agents into 
mutual cooperation. This assumed negative reciprocity was based on survey data 
and anthropologic field observation. The latter confirmed the important role of 
enviousness as a driver of many social interactions in the study villages. People 
are afraid to raise concerns of inequality as this might result in being bewitched 
by others. Thus, inequality raises the incentive for normative sanctioning. The 
severity of existing norm violations, on the other hand, serves as an antagonist 
driver. That is, agent's hope to draw defectors into mutual cooperation decreases 
with an increased concentration of herds. 
SES dynamics are considered as cooperative agents reduce their herd sizes and 
thus grazing pressure. Ecosystem dynamics, on the other hand, impact inequality 
and the severity of norm violations due to variable forage availability and 
resulting herd growth. The latter means that the ecosystem endogenously changes 
thresholds in the social model. The modelled norm is an adaptive institution; 
adapting to socio-ecological dynamics and impacting those. The impact of this 
non-linear SES feedback loop on the probability of SES collapse is the focus of 
investigation in chapter three. A second research question relates to the role of 
heterogeneity in agent attributes regarding model outcomes. That is, is it possible 
to reduce model complexity without changing results?
Our results indicate that the emergence of cooperation in following and 
sanctioning the norm significantly reduces the likelihood for SES collapse
constituting an incident of 100% livestock mortality. Collapse proves to be path-
dependent and only occurs after decades of unrestricted resource use. We could 
furthermore show that cooperation is an alternative stable state exhibiting 
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hysteresis. That is, reducing the factor that triggered a systemic change to the 
level before the change does not reverse the system to the previous state. This 
characteristic is documented for showcases of ecological resilience e.g. the 
eutrophication of lakes by phosphorus input (Carpenter et al. 1999) or shrub 
invasion on rangelands (Briske et al. 2003). The analogous phenomena of  
hysteresis in the endogenous formation of alternative social stable states was, at 
least to our knowledge, not shown before. We furthermore found that ecological 
crisis fosters cooperation (McAllister et al. 2011). During crisis, social 
reorganization became feasible as self-enforcing SES dynamics, opening a 
window of opportunity. 
A sensitivity analysis of the impact of agent heterogeneity on the probability of 
cooperation showed that heterogeneity in agent attributes is a prerequisite for 
cooperation. Moreover, the level of heterogeneity matters. That is, we found that 
the up-scaling technique of specifying agent attributes by means of random draws 
from normal distributions changes model results (Smajgl and Barreteau 2014). 
Thus, using available HH specific data for specifying agent attributes is advisable. 
The approach in chapter three was to integrate a generic model based on a theory 
of collective action into the existing, structurally realistic model, followed up by a 
detailed analysis of model behaviour. However, agent specification remained 
relatively simple. In order to test the modelled system with respect to real-life 
disturbances, the model must exhibit a certain level of granularity. Chapter four 
presents a more detailed model expanding agent heterogeneity with respect to 
structurally relevant differences. This allows investigating multi-scale resilience 
of the SES towards surprises because some scales involve processes of structural 
change within the social dimension of the SES. The importance of heterogeneity 
for structural change is also attested by Zimmermann and Heckelei (2012). 
1.3.3 Measuring multi-scale resilience of a communal livestock production SES 
in South Africa
Chapter four presents the most detailed model. Here, a HH typology introduces 
additional agent heterogeneity regarding timing of selling livestock and ecological 
feedbacks into the decision to sell, fertility management and HH expenditures. All 
sub-models are based on empirical data, which is also reflected by the more 
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extensive description of the case compared to the previous chapters. The objective 
is to quantify multi-scale resilience towards external disturbances (Miller et al. 
2010). We lay out a framework of SES scales and develop dynamic indicators, or 
surrogates, in order to quantify resilience. The resiliencies on the ecological, HH, 
community and socio-ecological scale were put into a joint perspective during 
analysis. The system is subject to the external disturbances of a multi-annual 
drought shock, a significant shift in ownership due to a high share of absentee 
herders and a fundamental change in anti-poverty policy. The general research 
question is the following:
How do the external disturbances affect resilience on each scale and how are the 
resiliencies coevolving? 
Another objective of chapter four was the development of multi-scale resilience 
measures as there are no unified concepts available for quantifying resilience in 
the first place (Carpenter et al. 2005). 
The lack of a resilience measurement framework may in part come from the 
multitude of resilience definitions in the literature. It offers definitions for 
engineering vs. ecological resilience (Ludwig et al. 2001; Peterson et al. 1998), 
social resilience based on concepts of HH vulnerability (Miller et al. 2010) or 
adaptive institutions (Adger 2000) and for socio-ecological resilience (Walker et 
al. 2002). 
Moreover, there are interpretations of resilience being normative contrary to being 
positivistic. Janssen et al. maintain a normative view on resilience when they state 
that rangeland managers try to “maintain the resilience of the system […]” (2002, 
p.103). For Carpenter et al., resilience is distinguished from theories of 
sustainability by separating the judgment of desirability of system states from its 
denotation (2001). Holling describes a negative resilience as a “perverse 
resilience, preserving a maladaptive system” (2001, p.400). Hawes and Reed view 
resilience as a measure of system health (2006). Here, it is important to note that 
“health” is related to the capacity of a system configuration to absorb change –
desirable or not. 
In summary, resilience is not clear-cut in its definitions and interpretations. The 
concept is also used differently depending on the scale of investigation and is 
often not directly observable (Carpenter et al. 2005). We defined resilience in two 
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ways: First viewed from a system identity perspective constituting a non-
normative concept (Cumming and Collier 2005). Here, resilience is the persistent 
identity of dynamic patterns emerging over different SES scales. A change in the 
type of dynamic pattern constitutes a loss of resilience. Second, we use normative 
resilience definitions specific to the scales of investigation. With this approach,
we aim at a multi-faceted view on resilience avoiding the dichotomy in the 
literature. 
In order to quantify resilience we identify resilience surrogates (Carpenter et al. 
2005) for each SES scale (ecosystem, HH and social or community resilience)
based on the literature and implement them as dynamic measures. Furthermore, 
we apply Walker et al.’s proposal to measure SES resilience by mapping the 
dynamic patterns of ecological with social resilience surrogates (Walker et al. 
2002). This approach is similar to Janssen et al. who applied it to different 
ecological scales (2002). To our knowledge, chapter four is the first application of 
Walker et al. to the socio-ecological scale (2002). 
The multi-scale perspective on resilience allowed us to investigate if there exists a 
trade-off between resilience on one scale with resilience on another. This view
puts desirability into the context of scale and thus introduces a meta-normative 
approach to the resilience analysis. For example, not everything serving the 
community is also beneficial to individuals and sustaining ecosystem resilience 
might only be achieved at the costs of decreasing HH resilience. Moreover, our 
approach to identify a change in resilience is non-normative by observing the 
change in the identity of dynamic patterns.
For the baseline scenario (status quo), we find that SES dynamics are in a limit 
cycle pattern. Here, we identify the initial stable attractor around which SES 
dynamics are fluctuating. The latter implies stable ecological and social states.
We use that basin of attraction for comparing the impact of disturbances (or 
surprises for that matter) on SES resilience. HH resilience shows a negative trend, 
not co-evolving with SES resilience.
A multi-annual drought pushed the system towards the boundary of attraction but 
the SES remained resilient and returned to the limit cycling pattern. However, the 
drought accelerated the decline of HH resilience. Neither ecological nor social 
resilience was lost.
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A second disturbance scenario mimics a significant increase in absentee herding 
in the community. Absentee herders are assumed to be not socially embedded 
with respect to the receptivity to normative sanctioning (see chapter 3) as they 
follow management rules determined by herd owners who are not residing in the 
community anymore. A share of 50% absentee herders in the village resulted in 
20% of the runs in SES collapse with a total distinction of herds. Resilience was 
lost on all scales in those cases. Emergent patterns disintegrated. 
The introduction of a basic income grant (third scenario) did not affect SES 
resilience albeit a slightly increased grazing pressure. However, the negative trend 
of HH resilience changed towards a converging pattern. That is, long term HH 
resilience was established and co-evolved with SES resilience. An investigation 
of individual HH found that the basic income grant enabled poor HH to 
successfully compete with richer HH for ecosystem services. The latter stopped 
the continuing exit of poorer HH from livestock production and resulted in stable 
states along all scales of the SES.
A limitation of the model structure in chapter four is its complexity. The 
complexity arises from additional modules introducing agent heterogeneity. This 
limits the sensitivity analysis in terms of the doable coverage of parameters. The 
trade-off between achieving structural realism and model complexity led us to 
recommend an intermediate level of complexity for future SES models. 
1.4 Conclusion
1.4.1 Summary of results
With our empirically based SES modelling approach, we find that a “resource-
blind” norm, reducing the peaks in grazing pressure, mitigates SES collapse. The 
social process modelled exhibits alternative stable social states. Regulating 
stocking rates is shown to be the most important management variable and the 
informal institution is doing exactly that. According to our results, institutional 
reorganization prescribing rotational grazing rules reduces socio-ecological 
variability but fails to meet the social criteria of increased animal productivity and 
equity among participants. We furthermore find that SES dynamics are in the 
basin of a stable attractor but HH resilience follows a downward trend. The 
ecosystem is resilient towards droughts. However, droughts are accelerating the 
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degradation of HH resilience. A loss of social embededdness, modelled as an 
increase in the share of defectors, increased the likelihood for SES collapse. The 
introduction of a basic income grant leads to a converging pattern in HH 
resilience while sustaining the resilience on other scales of the SES. 
1.4.2 Limitations and outlook
We find that the structurally realistic modelling approach applied throughout the 
chapters of the thesis is an appropriate way to capture relevant entities and 
dynamics of the underlying case study. However, the closeness to the case study 
is preventing the generalization of findings. In our view, the presented approach is
a mean for triangulation in case study research aiming at theory building rather 
than theory testing (Vaus 2001). 
In this sense, our results indicate the importance for negative reciprocity and 
“resource-blind” norms for the resilience of SES. Self-organizing institutions of 
resource governance are key for robust common-pool resource systems (Ostrom 
2005). However, they might not solely depend on the “good” efforts to organize 
resource use in order to be successful. That is, normative sanctioning based on 
"negative" emotions like enviousness can be of significant influence in 
establishing SES robustness. The latter complements the, at least in our view, 
over-stressed aspect of "good" governance of SES with its notions of strong 
leadership, cultural identity, trust and resource-targeted constitutional efforts.
Next, our results question the benefit of rotational grazing for the rangeland 
commons and stress the importance of local specificities like HH heterogeneity 
and resource size. That is, research on developing the rangeland commons must 
take the socio-ecological context into account. Finally, we lay out a measurement 
framework for multi-scale resilience. This framework is transferable to other 
cases as it uses surrogates that are universal for the rangeland commons.
Another limitation of our modelling approach is that it lacks the ability to mimic 
the processes of institutional innovation. That is, theories on how agents come up 
with new rules in response to socio-ecological surprises. Future research is 
needed to explore pathways of integrating theoretical models of this kind without 
bloating model size. One way to achieve this is to reduce model complexity to 
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stylized facts and to aim at an intermediate level of complexity as in stylized, or 
toy modelling approaches. 
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Chapter 2
Reorganizing resource use in a 
communal livestock production 
SES in South Africa7
Abstract. Livestock production on South Africa’s commons contributes 
significantly to livelihoods of communal households offering status, food and 
income. Management innovations are generally top-down and informed by 
commercial practices such as rotational grazing in combination with conservative 
stocking. Implementations often ignore how the specific socio-ecological context 
affects outcomes and the impact on equity. Science now acknowledges that 
rangeland management must be context specific and a universally agreed-upon 
recommendation for managing semi-arid rangelands does not exist. We present a 
socio-ecological simulation model derived from a case study in South Africa. It is 
used to assess the socio-ecological effects of rotational vs. continuous grazing 
under conservative and opportunistic stocking rates. We find that continuous 
grazing under conservative stocking rates leads to the most favourable outcomes 
from the social and the ecological perspective. However, past legacy under 
7 This part is the submission to an international multi-disciplinary journal as Rasch, S., Heckelei, T., 
Oomen, R.: Reorganizing resource use in a communal livestock production SES in South Africa. An 
earlier version is an accepted conference paper for oral presentation at the ICAE 2015 conference in 
Milano. 
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apartheid and participants’ expectations render its successful application unlikely 
as enforceability is not ensured. 
Keywords: Governance, Land Ownership and Tenure, Environment and 
Development, Simulation Modelling
JEL classification codes: Q010, Q150, Q560, C630
2.1 Introduction
Grazing livestock plays a vital role for livelihoods in southern Africa as it 
constitutes either a mean of subsistence or a financial buffer in unfavourable 
times (Dovie et al. 2006; Shackleton et al. 2001). In the case of South Africa, 
livestock is the most important agricultural capital good in the crowded areas of 
the former homelands where it is predominantly managed on common pool 
resources (Adams 2013; Vetter 2013). Considering the high population density 
and poverty in the former homelands, the South African government has 
emphasized the need to increase the economic benefits generated by those 
rangeland systems.  (Department of Agriculture 2007). However, projects in the 
communal rangelands are often implemented top-down, ignore stakeholder 
participation and their expectations (Jakoby et al. 2014; Atkinson 2013), and are 
guided by the persistent assumption that rangeland commons are generally 
overstocked and degraded (Adams 2013; Naumann 2014; Harrison and 
Shackleton 1999). Improvements are thought to be achievable by imposing 
rotational grazing and conservative stocking rates as practiced in the commercial 
sector (Campbell et al. 2006). There is little concern how those measures can be 
adapted to fit to specific needs of heterogeneous stakeholders and how measures 
affect equity (Vetter 2013). Moreover, enforcing those measures by the 
community causes considerable transaction costs and the willingness to invest in 
suitable institutional processes (Campbell et al. 2000). In short, the human 
dimension of grazing systems is not yet adequately considered in management 
policies targeted at communal grazing systems in South Africa (Vetter 2005). 
According to Vetter (2013), the policy for the development and management of 
the rangeland commons should achieve
• better resource management for sustainable land-use activities
• greater contribution of rangelands to livelihoods,
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• greater equity in distributing benefits from the rangeland 
Another important aspect for livelihoods is economic risk and uncertainty (Martin 
et al. 2014). As livestock functions as a safety-net (Shackleton et al. 2001), huge 
fluctuations in herd size reduce their inherent capacity to buffer against 
unforeseeable adverse circumstances. Thus, we add “reduced variability in herd 
size and profits” as a fourth desirable goal of management. That is, livestock 
husbandry must remain a viable strategy in most of the years (Mace and Houston 
1989). We further assume that benefits from management alternatives should 
match participant’s expectations in order to be sustainable and that past legacies 
impact the likelihood for success (Frey and Jegen 2001). 
Using a simulation model for a community rangeland case in South Africa, we 
investigate if the introduction of rotational grazing and conservative stocking 
satisfies the outlined development goals and discuss the constraints for a 
successful change in management. Although the focus of this paper is on social 
benefits from rangeland management options, we first start presenting an outline 
of the ecological debate and its management implications in the next section. The 
third section presents the case. Thereafter the simulation model is described in a 
condensed manner according to the ODD+D protocol for social agent based 
models. Scenarios and measures of performance are outlined in section five. This 
then followed by model results (6) and a discussion of results (7).  
2.2 The ecological debate and management implications
Next to social implications of top-down policies in the commons, ecological 
debates in rangeland science are not yet fully resolved (Briske et al. 2008; 
Campbell et al. 2006). Two areas of theoretical dichotomy in rangeland science 
have been the discourses of equilibrium vs. non-equilibrium systems (Briske et al. 
2003) and of engineering vs. ecological resilience (Peterson et al. 1998; Vetter 
2009). These theoretical debates relate to diverging management paradigms on 
stocking rates and spatial-temporal grazing strategies.
The equilibrium system understanding assumes that rangelands exhibit reversal 
and continuous dynamics. An optimal stocking rate is assumed above which 
increased competition for forage causes a decrease in animal performance (Oba et 
al. 2000). Livestock survival is density-dependent. Degradation occurs due to 
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overstocking. Equilibrium theory is criticized to neglect the impact of climatic 
variability which is predominant in arid and semi-arid areas (Briske et al. 2003). 
Proponents of the “new thinking” in rangeland ecology propagating non-
equilibrium theory for arid and semi-arid rangelands argue that abiotic factors, 
and here rainfall variability in particular, to be a far more important cause for 
livestock mortality. Population crashes are inevitable and solely induced by 
droughts. That is, mortality is density-independent. Degradation is likewise not a 
result of grazing but induced by abiotic factors (Vetter 2005). Non-equilibrium 
theory is criticized to neglect any potential negative effect of intensive grazing 
(Wessels et al. 2007). 
Management implications derived from equilibrium and non-equilibrium theory, 
are conservative and opportunistic stocking rates, respectively (Sandford and 
Scoones 2006). Conservative stocking tries to avoid crossing the carrying 
capacity of rangelands by employing relatively low and constant stocking rates 
(Holechek et al. 1999). In contrast, opportunism maximizes resource utilization in 
favourable years and assumes that the rangeland will recover under light stocking 
after an ecological crisis. Recovery is possible as livestock is either sold in 
drought years or due to un-intended resting caused by events of high mortality 
(Müller et al. 2007). However, opportunism commands the absence of significant 
supplementary feeding or restocking in drought years (Campbell et al. 2006; 
Vetter 2005; Briske et al. 2003). There is a stark controversy which of the two 
grazing practices is more suitable in semi-arid rangeland systems. See for 
example the dispute between (Campbell et al. 2000) and (Sandford and Scoones 
2006). From an economic perspective, temporally high opportunity costs of 
conservative stocking has to be weighed against reduced average productivity 
under opportunistic stocking (Campbell et al. 2006).
A second pair of management strategies related to the discussion is rotational vs. 
continuous grazing. The rationale of rotational grazing is to allow the vegetation 
to rest in order to recover. It was introduced in South Africa in order to mimic 
evolutionary grazing patters of traditional transhumance which was restricted by 
settlements in the early 20th century (Vetter 2005). However, the new rangeland 
science argues that rest times are not necessary as the resource will eventually 
recover after droughts under light grazing (Müller et al. 2007). Briske et al. found 
that empirical evidence from the past 60 years could not support the superiority of 
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rotational grazing (2008). According to the authors, a key management dilemma 
with rotational grazing is the goal of simultaneously optimizing residual leaf area 
and utilization by livestock for production. This is especially relevant for semi-
arid areas where high quality forage of under-utilized pastures does rapidly 
senescent.  
However, also the proponents of continuous grazing acknowledge that longer 
term rests (“rest-rotation”), where a part of the resource is rested during the 
growth period, might be ecologically beneficial (Briske et al. 2008; Bennett et al. 
2010; Snyman 1998). 
The notion of single and multiple stable states associated with equilibrium and 
non-equilibrium systems is reflected in the discourse on ecosystem resilience 
(Vetter 2009). A classical ecological understanding of resilience is known as 
engineering resilience (Peterson et al. 1998). It assumes a single equilibrium and 
understands resilience as the “speed of recovery” and resistance as the ability to 
withstand disturbances (Adger 2000). Engineering resilience is criticized for 
ignoring sudden shifts in system states if system inherent thresholds are crossed 
(Peterson et al. 1998). Here, examples of lake eutrophication (Carpenter et al. 
1999), and more relevant for rangeland systems, transitions from grassland to 
shrub-dominated systems are described and illustrated by simple ball-and-cup 
metaphors (Jeltsch et al. 1997; Anderies et al. 2002; Vetter 2009; Briske et al. 
2003). A system is considered resilient in this context, if it does not change its 
fundamental functions when facing external shocks, (Walker et al. 2006). From a 
social perspective, this definition does not consider the costs for being resilient in 
the first place (Béné 2013). Even in the absence of alternative states, grazing 
pressure and resting time of the vegetation might determine the costs for 
withstanding disturbance and enduring recovery time for stakeholders. However, 
management implications of the resilience discourses are not as clear-cut as for 
the non-equilibrium discourse. At least for Harrison and Shackelton, conservative 
stocking rates and rotational grazing are not needed for resilient rangelands
(1999).  
The scientific discourse is currently resolving the dichotomy of equilibrium vs. 
non-equilibrium rangeland systems and acknowledges that there is a gradient 
between these dynamics. Rangeland systems can exhibit both: equilibrium and 
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non-equilibrium dynamics. Or, they exhibit a dynamic equilibrium (Briske et al. 
2003, see also Huston 1979 for a detailed discussion on this matter). Likewise, 
voices are raised that those ball-and-cup metaphors of ecological resilience are 
“deceptively simplistic” and that there are indeed systems that are better described 
by continuous and reversible dynamics. Harrison and Shackelton found that South 
African “communal grazing areas are extremely resilient” (1999, p.237) as they 
recover rapidly in less than 10 years after abandoning grazing.  Therefore, it 
seems worthwhile to consider return time and resistance in those cases, as they 
might be highly relevant from a management perspective. 
The growing consensus, however, does not yet come with clear management 
implications. That is, the question remains unanswered if rangeland systems in 
semi-arid areas should employ conservative or opportunistic stocking and if 
rotational grazing is favourable over continuous grazing. At least for stocking 
regimes, Campbell et al. offer an attempt to overcome the polarization in the 
debate differentiating between rangeland systems according to framing 
conditions. Or, as they term it: ”one size does not fit all” (2006, p.81) and went 
further to note that grazing policies need a case-by-case analysis. Likewise, 
Müller et al.’s (2007) findings support those of Scoones (1994) that “there are no 
universally applicable grazing strategies, because particular context-specific 
conditions have to be taken into account” (p.311). This observation might 
especially fit to those ecosystems that are on the threshold of what is considered a 
non-equilibrium system. Here, systems with a rainfall coefficient of variability 
(CV) above 33% belong to this category (Behnke 2000). Moreover, context-
specificity is evident in the heterogeneity of households (HH) managing a 
common pool resource regime (Vetter 2005). Especially the impact of 
heterogeneity in HH assets on socio-ecological outcomes, and resulting positive 
feedbacks increasing stratification and thus inequality has - at least to our 
knowledge not yet received any attention. 
One way to test for the impact of management alternatives considering the socio-
ecological context are simulation models.  According to Briske et al., simulation 
modelling is well suited to “evaluate the managerial and ecological components 
of grazing management, both independently and in combination” (2008, p.11). 
Simulation models are further useful to explore the combined effect of density-
dependent and density-independent effects in these systems (Vetter 2005) and are 
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thus able to overcome the polarization of the debate. Moreover, models can 
forecast outcomes of strategies that become only visible after decades in semi-arid 
regions (Müller et al. 2007). For representing the human dimension of the system, 
agent based models  demonstrated already their ability to account for 
heterogeneity, bounded rational decision making and social context (Chion et al. 
2011; Chen et al. 2012; Heckbert et al. 2010; Jager et al. 2000; Bhattacharyya and 
Ohlsson 2010). 
In the next section, we present a case of a communal rangeland system on the 
brink between equilibrium and non-equilibrium with a CV of 30% and a high 
recovery potential making it resilient towards droughts and grazing stress. 
Thereafter, a socio-ecological system model is presented according to the 
ODD+D protocol. The model subsequently serves to explore the effects of 
rotational grazing and destocking. We use the above stated policy goals for 
developing the rangeland commons as a benchmark to assess alternative 
management options.
2.3 The case
The case, a communal livestock production SES, is located within the former 
homeland of Bphuthatswana (Jacobs 2001) in the Free State, South Africa. The 
village community of Sediba uses a common pool resource rangeland for beef-
cattle production. For the sake of reducing complexity in description and later 
model specification, we are ignoring more fine-grained differences in HH 
decision making and informal institutions which were identified but which are not 
the focus of this paper.
2.3.1 Ecosystem
The region is categorized as a semi-arid grassland biome (Rutherford and 
Westfall 1994) with a mean precipitation of 537 mm per annum (Swemmer et al. 
2007; Woyessa et al. 2006) and providing forage as the main ecosystem service. 
The vegetation belongs to the “Moist Cool Highveld Grassland Type” 
(Bredenkamp and van Rooyen 1996), which covers the central eastern parts of the 
Free State province. Dominant species are perennial C4 bunchgrasses such as 
Themeda triandra, Eragrostis lehmanniana and Digitaria eriantha, and hence it is 
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commonly referred to as “sweet veld” (Palmer and Ainslie 2005), with ‘sweet’ 
referring to relatively good palatability of the vegetation and ‘veld’ being a South 
African term for rangeland. Shrub vegetation is absent on the rangeland (pers. 
comm. Roelof Oomen), which is grazed by cattle as the dominant grazer. The CV 
for the region is 30% (Behnke 2000). García et al.’s (2014) analysis confirmed 
that of Harrison and Shackelton (1999) insofar as plant communities on the 
communal rangelands exposed to intense grazing are well adapted and “show fast 
growth rates and quick return strategies”. Linstädter et al. also indicated the 
regenerative potential for this grassland biome under communal management
(2014). The authors only find small or no differences in the abundance of 
perennial grasses between commercially and communally managed systems after 
a period of good rainfall. To summarize, the grassland biome under investigation 
is highly resilient (ecological resilience) towards droughts and grazing pressure 
and a clear alternative stable state, for example due to bush encroachment, cannot 
be identified. However, climatic variability and mean annual precipitation are 
characteristic for a semi-arid system. Thus, fluctuations in forage quantity, and 
even more important in forage quality, are high.
2.3.2 Social system
Sediba comprises about 160 HH and 83 HH own cattle. However, ownership is 
fluctuating as villagers are exiting and (re-)entering into livestock production due 
to herd losses or animal re-acquisitions in the context of droughts. In accordance 
with Berzborn’s findings, livestock is not perceived as a main source of income 
but as a “top-up” to off-farm income (2007, p.679). However, the average herd 
size in Sediba is worth more than the average yearly per-capita income in the 
village. Thus, livestock is an important buffer against unforeseeable 
circumstances. Measured at an upper poverty line of 1000 Rand (949 Rand in 
2008), the head count ratio is 61% although stratification is evident with 
individuals earning up to 3000 Rand per month (Leibbrandt et al. 2010). HH 
income mainly consists of state grants and remittances. Income from wage labour 
is generally low due to scarce employment opportunities. 
Off-farm income is a strong supporter of agricultural activities with respect to 
animal (re)-acquisitions after population crashes and to purchase supplementary 
feeding, although for the latter to a lesser extent. Many low-income HH do not 
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practice supplementary feeding. Livestock is only bought in case a HH wants to 
enter into production. Generally, HH use simple rules of thumb based on animal 
characteristics to decide which animal to sell. Sediba has no direct access to 
formal markets and owners sell livestock to local traders or so called “fly-by-
nights”. 
After the fall of Apartheid, all formal institutions of resource governance 
disintegrated. Participants have lost their adaptive capacity to reorganize their 
institutional environments after decades of external interventions, resettlements 
and betterment schemes (Naumann 2014). However, the rangeland is not an open-
access resource as access for other villages is not permitted. Thus, individual 
herders decide on their own management without formal regulation of stocking 
rates. The 2500 ha large rangeland is utilized under continuous grazing with 
livestock roaming freely on the rangeland. 
The villagers’ acceptance of a rotational grazing scheme was very high with 
95.5% of HH strongly welcoming it (Appendix A). Moreover, most HH expect a 
significant increase of 50% in animal productivity if this scheme is adopted 
(Appendix A). However, 86.9% of the respondents state that the community is not 
able to enforce rotational grazing under self-governance and support enforcement 
by an external institution (Appendix A). 
A share of 89.7% of the HH did not agree to restrict their herd size (Appendix A). 
Thus, the only possibility to achieve a maximum stocking rate is an externally 
enforcement of a maximum herd size on HH level as practiced during Apartheid. 
However, this is overshadowed by the way past interventions were implemented 
(Naumann 2014). Massive culling operations have taken place that culminated 
1983 in the “great Bphuthatswana Donkey Massacre” (Jacobs 2001). Those top-
down interventions ignored people’s needs and created the observed resentments 
against reducing herd sizes. 
To summarize, core elements to be considered in a structurally realistic model of 
this case are:
• High recovery potential of vegetation and variability in rainfall
• Differentiation between forage quantity and quality
• Importance of heterogeneous off-farm income for supplementary feeding 
and restocking
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• Use of individual heuristics for selling animals
We omit to implement other details of the case in the model in order to minimize 
model complexity. The next section presents the model structure according to the 
ODD+D protocol for agent based models (Müller et al. 2013). Results from 
model analysis  of rotational grazing and destocking scenarios are presented then 
and  discussed in light of people’s expectations and perceptions in the last section.
2.4 ODD+D protocol
This section utilizes a recent update of the ODD protocol (Grimm et al. 2010) for 
agent based model description. The ODD+D protocol has been developed to 
better account for describing human decision making (Müller et al. 2013). The 
ODD protocol is structured hierarchically with respect to the complexity of model 
description. It starts with a general overview, reveals design concepts and 
concludes with a detailed presentation of the model. The resulting redundancy in 
the presentation is thought to be outweighed by enhanced replicability and 
comparability. Here, we follow Müller et al.’s recommendation to present the 
overview and design concepts in the text and to provide the full ODD+D protocol, 
including details, as an online appendix (http://www.ilr.uni-
bonn.de/agpo/publ/techpap/Techpap15-01.pdf).
2.4.1 Overview
Purpose
The purpose of the model is to assess the socio-ecological outcomes of spatial-
temporal grazing and stocking strategies for a case in South Africa. Outcomes are 
evaluated against four defined goals for developing the rangeland commons. 
Strategies encompass rotational and continuous grazing combined with either 
opportunistic or conservative stocking. The model was designed for policy 
analysis of rangeland management options for a case in South Africa.
Entities, state variables and scales
Social agents are aggregated at the household (HH) level distinguishing two HH 
agent types: a livestock producing HH agent and a HH agent who does not own 
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livestock. Cattle being heifers, cows or bulls represent the livestock agent. A 
fourth entity is the common rangeland providing the ecosystem service of forage 
production. Biomass production is modelled as photosynthetic and senescent 
biomass in order to mimic fluctuations in forage quality.
Income, expenditures, savings, HH size and age of the HH head characterize both 
HH agents. Livestock producing HH agents are additionally described by number 
and types of livestock agents owned, the memory of past profits, and the selling 
rule.  HH agents can switch their type during the simulation depending on entry 
and exit rules. Livestock agents have a bodyweight, age, gender and, in the case 
of cows, a value for the number of calves. Important state variables of the 
rangeland are shoot biomass green, shoot biomass senescent and basal cover. 
Appendix (B) provides a list of state variables and parameters. The next section 
with the empirical background refers to the data files.
Space is implicitly considered in the consumption and production of forage per 
ha. Here the resource size is constant but herd sizes vary over time. The model 
runs with daily (ecosystem) and monthly (social system) time steps over a period 
of 125 years.  
Process overview and scheduling
The rangeland entity produces biomass on a daily basis that is reduced by 
monthly forage consumption. Livestock agents update monthly live-weight from 
forage consumption. All HH agents predict their expenditures at the beginning of 
each month. They decide on entering or might be forced to exit livestock 
production in every month. The amount of supplementary feeding is calculated 
once per year and is specific to agent attributes. Livestock is born and dies in one 
month of the year (August). Livestock producing HH agents draw a new heuristic 
selling rule in every fourth year (production cycle).  Figure 2.1 depicts the time 
intervals and order of scheduled events.
34 2.4 ODD+D protocol
Figure 2.1 Model flow and scheduling
2.4.2 Design concepts
Theoretical and empirical background
A living standards and measurement HH survey (Worldbank 15.11.2013) was 
conducted in four villages of the rural area in the north of Thaba Nchu. It 
encompassed 350 HH and was adapted to the local context. The survey was 
administered to livestock producers and to HH not owning livestock. For the 
village of Sediba, the case to be modelled here, the survey covered the whole 
population of livestock owning HH. Additionally, vegetation samples were taken 
in Sediba and a second village and used to calibrate the rangeland model. All field 
activities were conducted by a research group (http://www.fg1501.uni-koeln.de/) 
funded by the German Research Foundation from 2010 until 2013. Links to HH 
survey templates, coding schemes, survey data, weather data and input data files 
used in the model can be found in the appendix (A). 
The model is designed to account for the impact of abiotic (climatic) and biotic 
(competition) factors and their combined effect on herd survival (Vetter 2005). 
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The ecosystem design (biomass growth) is guided by the need to account for 
climatic variability in semi-arid areas (McAllister et al. 2011, p.1). This is 
achieved by means of a daily temporal resolution.  The ecosystem model 
constitutes the adoption of the Lingra model to semi-arid rangelands 
(Schapendonk et al. 1998). Livestock dynamics in terms of mortality and 
reproduction employs the notion of over-compensatory growth, forage quantity 
and quality as modelled in Gross et al. (2006). Stocking densities are an emergent 
outcome of ecosystem determined herd dynamics and social interaction.
Agents are assumed to be boundedly rational (Carpenter and Brock 2004, p.5; 
Ebenhöh 2006; Ebenhöh and Pahl-Wostl 2008; Feola and Binder 2010, p.2324; 
Schlüter and Pahl-Wostl 2007; Schlüter et al. 2012, p.231; Janssen and Ostrom 
2006, p.6). Agents do not have full information and lack the computational ability 
to plan decisions in a fully rational manner. They use adaptive heuristics instead. 
Bounded rationality was assumed on the basis of empirical evidence from the 
case study. The HH survey revealed that respondents use simple heuristics or 
even random choice for selling cattle. Additionally, high climatic variability in 
semi-arid areas imposes constraints to full rationality in terms of information 
availability. Here, information about ecological outcomes is scarce and uncertain. 
Other structurally relevant, but not focal, decisions are HH expenditures, the level 
of supplementary feeding and the decision to enter into livestock husbandry. 
Available data allowed for statistical estimation of expenditures, supplementary 
feeding and entries in the form of regressions. The according analysis can be 
found in the sub-model section of the extended ODD+D protocol 
(http://www.ilr.uni-bonn.de/agpo/publ/techpap/Techpap15-01.pdf).
A randomized twelve-year time series on weather data from the region serves to 
model the exogenous impact of climate. Survey data from the village of Sediba 
allows specifying the number, types, state variables and parameters of HH agents 
in the model (Appendix A). 
Individual decision making
This section, distinguishes between four decision making models. The first three 
relate to concepts behind modelling HH expenditures, supplementary feeding and 
entries.  The third depicts the decision to sell livestock. 
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All HH agents decide on how much to spend from the monthly HH budget based 
on income and HH size. HH agents not owning livestock decide whether to buy a 
cow in order to enter livestock production. However, HH agents need to have 
sufficient savings to do so. HH expenditures are determined by a linear regression 
on HH size and income that does not account for uncertainty in the prediction. 
The level of supplementary feeding is likewise computed by a linear regression 
on income and the herd size also not accounting for uncertainty in the prediction. 
A logistic regression predicting the probability to enter reflects uncertainty in the 
entry decision. HH only enter if a random number drawn from a uniform 
distribution is lower or equal than this probability. HH exit livestock production 
due to livestock mortality or the selling decision. No temporal or spatial aspects 
are considered in the decisions on expenditures, entries and exits.
Sold livestock is reducing grazing pressure and does not just change ownership 
within the village. This assumption is based on survey data which revealed that 
83% of all sales go to butcheries or traders visiting the villages regularly 
(Appendix A). Livestock sold within the village is often slaughtered by the buyers 
for ritual usage during funerals. Only a minority of cattle is sold to HH who want 
to enter livestock production and HH don’t buy livestock to increase their herds8. 
Livestock producers decide if, how much and which type of livestock to sell.
Producers decide which selling rule to use depending on the economic success 
during past production cycles. The probability to keep a distinct selling heuristic 
increases with the economic success associated with the heuristic. Lower profit of 
the past production cycle increases the probability to experiment with the selling 
rule for the next cycle. The objective is to maximize economic success which is 
done by inductive reasoning on the basis of limited information. The described 
decision making process is implemented with a genetic algorithm (Goldberg and 
Holland 1988). Here heuristic rules and values for applying these rules are 
encoded. Economic success determines fitness values of solution chromosomes. 
Solution chromosomes are chosen depending on a roulette-wheel draw with 
8 Less than 2% of the total herd size was bought by HH during the last 12 months before the 
interview (Appendix A)
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probabilities weighted according to the fitness values. The random draw of 
solution chromosomes mimics uncertainty in the decision of rule adoption and 
updating of fitness values reduces uncertainty. The temporal aspect plays a role in 
the agent’s memory of past economic successes. The decision model does not 
account for spatial aspects.
Learning
The selling decision makes use of reinforcement learning. A distinction is made 
between heuristic rules and the values used for applying these rules. Here, agents 
decide to sell bulls and cows according to their age, cows according to the number 
of calves or according to which of the two conditions is satisfied first9. The 
genetic algorithm produces new combinations of heuristics and values by means 
of crossover and mutation. Fitter rule-value combinations survive during the 
process. Here, fitness refers to economic success of rule-value combinations. 
Thus, agents using this decision model aim to increase profits. However, they are 
not optimizers as they use the non-optimizing strategy of reinforcement learning 
(Gigerenzer and Selten 2002). Agents choose what worked best in the past rather 
than computing an optimal strategy beforehand. With Wilson et al.’s words, 
agents are “assumed to be boundedly rational, profit maximizers” (Wilson et al. 
2007, p. 15213).
Individual sensing
HH agents know all own attributes including livestock attributes of their own 
herds. 
Individual prediction
HH agents predict their expenditures, the level of supplementary feeding and their 
probability to enter into livestock husbandry. 
9 Ranges for values are derived from survey data (Appendix A)
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Interaction
Interactions of livestock agents are indirectly via the rangeland. Cattle compete 
for forage. Similarly, Livestock producing HH agents compete with each other 
indirectly via resource appropriation of their herds. 
Collectives
There are no agent collectives in the model.
Heterogeneity
Livestock producing HH agents are heterogeneous in the use of selling heuristics. 
Stochasticity
Random numbers ensure implementation of probabilities regarding the following 
variables: cattle mortality and births, HH entering livestock production and choice 
of selling heuristics.
Observation
Basal cover (%), average agricultural profit (Rand) and the monetary value of the 
current herd (Rand) are collected on a monthly basis.
2.4.3 Details
For the details of the model and its submodels, we refer to the full ODD+D in the 
online appendix (http://www.ilr.uni-bonn.de/agpo/publ/techpap/Techpap15-
01.pdf).
2.5 Scenarios and measures of performance
The following section outlines modelled scenarios and evaluation criteria.
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2.5.1 Scenarios
Continuous Opportunism - Baseline
The baseline scenario reflects the current strategy mix of continuous grazing and 
opportunistic stocking. Here the opportunistic strategy is based on die-offs and 
slow recovery rather than on de- and restocking, or tracking (Müller et al. 2007). 
According to Toulmin, slow recovery is ecologically superior to immediate 
restocking (1994). It is, however, a “waste of grazing resources” (Müller et al. 
2007, p.314). Results for the baseline scenario are used in the analysis as a 
reference indicating the relative impacts of alternative grazing schemes. 
Rotational Opportunism
To assess the impact of rest-rotation on the system, we implemented a version of 
rotational grazing which is currently practiced by farmers in the commercial 
sector (Table 2.1). This specific system was recommended by a local expert from 
the South African department of Agricultural development (pers. comm. H. J. 
Fouché).  The rangeland is divided into three land categories grazed over different 
periods during the year. Here, it is important to note that rotational cycles are not 
of equal lengths such that one of the three land categories is rested over the whole 
vegetation phase from October until April. The other two parts are grazed during 
a certain time span in the vegetation phase each. Full resting in the critical phase 
of rapid plant growth is applied sequentially for the three land categories over a 
three-year schedule.  This system is adapted to the ecological context in terms of 
inter-annual climatic variability by accounting for rainy and wet seasons in terms 
the division of grazing camps during the specific months of the year. 
Table 2.1 Rotational grazing system
Year September Oct. - Dec. Jan. - Apr. May Jun. - Aug. 
1 A B C B A
2 B C A C B
3 C A B A C
note: Letters and shades indicate a specific area of the rangeland. Shades only serve visual clarity.
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For the scenarios testing rotational grazing, we divided the Sediba rangeland 
(2500 ha) in three equal parts which are utilized in the described manner.  Rule 
conformance of HH is assumed. In this scenario, no restrictions on herd size are 
in place.
Continuous Conservative Stocking
As outlined before, imposing a maximum or conservative stocking rate is 
problematic for several reasons. First, no formal institution is in place to regulate 
stocking rates on a community level. Second, the rangeland is not sufficiently 
large for allowing big herds for all HH. Third, each HH must be able to sustain a 
large-enough herd for sustaining production in case of high mortality incidences.  
The first argument implies that maximum herd sizes can only be applied on HH 
level. The dilemma between the second and third argument calls for a 
compromise with respect to the maximum stocking rate per HH. For our analysis, 
we use a maximum of 15 cattle, which is above the current average but below the 
current maximum per HH. Arguably, this “soft” conservative stocking rate, 
reducing peaks in grazing pressure, is based on plausibility considerations and 
should be further investigated in future analysis. However, a sensitivity analysis 
of this variable goes beyond the scope of this paper. Our aim is to test for a 
general effect of restricting opportunism in the system. In this scenario, no spatio-
temporal grazing patterns are applied. 
Rotational Conservative Stocking
A last scenario combines the outlined strategies of rotational grazing and 
conservative stocking in order to test for potential interaction effects between the 
two management alternatives. 
2.5.2 Measures of system performance
In the following section, operationalizations for measures of ecosystem state, 
productivity, economic variability and equity are presented.
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Ecosystem state
We measure ecosystem state with an indicator for rangeland condition (Walker et 
al. 2002). Here, we use the slow changing ecological indicator of basal cover 
measuring the percentage surface area covered by plants. Basal cover is used by 
Wiegland et al. (2004) and Snymann (2005) to assess the quality for semi-arid 
grassland ecosystems in South Africa. In order to detangle the impact of grazing 
stress from drought shocks and climatic variability, we compute a reference time 
series of basal cover in an un-grazed state as a benchmark for the different 
scenarios. As grazing can have a negative or positive effect on rangeland 
condition, this reference scenario is not an optimal state but one which shows the 
impact of climatic variability in isolation. Figure 2.2 shows an exemplary time 
series comparing basal cover dynamics of an un-grazed system with a system 
under high grazing pressure. All modelled scenarios, as well as the un-grazed 
reference system, are driven by a deterministic weather file based on empirical 
data from the region (Appendix A). The main climatic shock to the system is a 
multi-annual drought occurring in the middle of the simulation. The use of a 
single weather file allows comparing basal cover dynamics for different 
management regimes under ceteris paribus conditions with respect to abiotic 
factors. 
Figure 2.2 Basal cover dynamics in the absence and presence of grazing pressure
In the analysis, we refer to the basal cover dynamics of the un-grazed state as the 
“resilience pattern” atess it resembles the magnitude of distortion and recovery of 
the ecosystem resulting solely from the multi-annual drought periods and inter-
annual climatic variability. 
Deviations from the resilience pattern due to grazing show the additional impact 
of grazing on ecosystem state. The percentage deviations from the resilience 
pattern for each month over multiple runs result in a certain frequency distribution 
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for each management scenario. Frequency distributions allow for quantification 
beyond a mere graphical presentation of deviating patterns.
Productivity
To asses if alternative grazing management increases the contribution of 
rangelands to livelihoods, we measure system performance in terms of total 
generated profits over the simulation period. Profits are summed over all HH and 
are the result of subtracting costs for supplementary fodder and animal (re)-
acquisition from sale revenues. Thus, we account for the costs of capital as 
suggested by Campell et al. (2000) and by Sandford and Scoones (2006). 
Economic variability
As livestock production should remain a viable strategy over time, we measure 
the average monthly variability in the value of HH based livestock production 
(Martin et al. 2014). That is, the variation of what buffers any HH from 
economically unfavourable circumstances that can occur anytime. This is defined 
as the monetary value of herds in any month plus monthly generated profits from 
sales and we refer to it as HH buffer capacity from now on. We assume that 
increased variation in buffer capacity reduces planning security and thus increases 
uncertainty. We measure the variation as the standard deviation of HH buffer 
capacity.
Equity
To arrive at a measure for the goal of achieving greater equity among resource 
users, we observed the level and change of buffer capacity over different income 
classes and time. Resulting time series allow to visually comparing the evolution 
of HH buffer capacities along off-farm income gradients. Moreover, an 
investigation of time series can give an indication if there are differences in how 
HH recover from population crashes by utilizing off-farm income.
2.6 Results
In the following section, simulation results from the four scenarios are presented 
for ecosystem state, productivity, economic variability and equity.
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2.6.1 Ecosystem state
The effect of different grazing strategies with respect to sustainable land-use 
activities (first goal) is assessed by quantifying the impact of grazing on the 
resilience of the ecosystem.
Table 2.2 shows a summary statistic of deviations from the resilience pattern 
(baseline) under grazing stress for the four scenarios.  Monthly percentage 
deviations were computed over 300 runs to account for stochasticity in the model. 
All scenarios show a negative mean percentage deviation from the resilience 
pattern of the un-grazed system albeit a considerable difference between the 
baseline and the other three scenarios. That is, grazing stress under continuous 
grazing with opportunistic stocking results in a negative mean deviation from the 
resilience pattern of -31.4% whereas the other scenarios result in mean negative 
deviations ranging from -2.3 % until -1.2%.  
Table 2.2 Summary statistics - % deviation from resilience pattern under the four 
grazing scenarios
Statistics
Continuous 
Opportunism
Rotational 
Opportunism
Continuous 
Conservative 
Stocking
Rotational 
Conservative 
Stocking
N
Valid 443100 443100 443100 443100
Missing 0 0 0 0
Mean (%) -31.35 -2.02 -2.27 -1.17
Std. Deviation (%) 27.78 4.11 5.85 3.68
Percentiles
20 (%) -60.05 -4.57 -6.63 -3.68
40 (%) -32.39 -3.11 -4.49 -2.54
60 (%) -15.69 -1.95 -1.80 -1.35
80 (%) -6.51 .94 2.2 1.52
A similar discrepancy between the baseline and the three alternative scenarios is 
the variation of deviations. Here, continuous grazing under opportunistic stocking 
results in a standard deviation of 27.8% whereas the next higher standard 
deviation was found to be 5.8% for continuous grazing under conservative 
stocking. It is furthermore worth to note that all scenarios, except for the baseline, 
show improvements of the rangeland condition in 20% of the months (see 80% 
percentile, Table 2.2). This result resembles Briske et al.’s empirical findings that 
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grazing increased primary production in 20% of investigated rangeland cases 
(2008).  
Figure 2.3 (A) shows the frequency distribution of monthly percentage deviations 
from the resilience pattern for continuous grazing under opportunistic stocking as 
currently practiced in the village. Here, grazing stress significantly lowers the 
resistance of the ecosystem and leads to events of severe ecological collapse. The 
latter is e.g. evident in a small cluster of negative percentage deviations above 
95%. Here, basal cover is substantially reduced but recovery can take place as the 
system does not remain in the severely depleted state for longer time spans.  
Figures 2.3 (B), (C) and (D) shows the percentage deviations for the other three 
scenarios; rotational grazing under opportunistic (B) and conservative stocking 
(D) as well as continuous grazing under conservative stocking (C). All three 
distributions show a similar resistance under grazing stress resulting in a 
percentage deviation from the resilience pattern above -6.6% in 80% of all 
months. The lowest negative deviation of the three distributions occurs for 
continuous grazing under conservative stocking with -18%. 
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Figure 2.3 Frequencies of 
% deviations from 
resilience pattern under 
(A) continuous grazing 
and opportunistic 
stocking, (B) rotational 
grazing and opportunistic 
stocking, (C) continuous
grazing under 
conservative stocking and 
(D) rotational grazing 
under conservative 
stocking.
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To summarize, all three alterations in grazing strategies result in an improvement 
of the ecosystem’s drought resistance compared to the currently practiced system 
of continuous grazing under opportunistic stocking. 
However, an improved rangeland condition does not necessarily translate into 
socially preferred outcomes as resources might be underutilized. Moreover, the 
presented frequency distribution for the baseline scenario only implicitly accounts 
for the speed of recovery, or resilience. The latter might have an impact on social 
outcomes that will be investigated in the next sections.
2.6.2 Productivity
As said above, we assess the contribution of rangelands to livelihoods as relative 
changes in profits. Here, we use an aggregate measure being the average of total 
profits over all livestock producing HH generated over the simulation period. 
Profitability per HH is measured as total revenues from livestock sales minus 
expenses for supplementary feeding and (re)-acquisition of animals. Note that the 
analysis focuses on relative differences in profitability instead on absolute figures 
as the model uses fixed input and selling prices varying in a pre-determined 
range. That is, a ceteris paribus approach with respect to the macro-economic 
framework is not suitable to predict absolute values with sufficient certainty. 
However, the focus of this analysis lies on the relative superiority of alternative 
grazing strategies related to distinct management goals.
An analysis of variance and subsequent post-hoc S-N-K tests were conducted to 
asses if differences in group means over multiple runs are significant. Significant 
differences between the four grazing strategies were found with F(3,1196) = 
9733.873, p<0.05. A S-N-K post-hoc test on group differences found three 
homogenous sub-groups (Table 2.3). Both rotational grazing scenarios form one 
group and the two continuous grazing scenarios represent the other two. That is, 
no profit differences are found between the rotational grazing strategies but 
differences between rotational grazing and both continuous grazing strategies 
were significant. The lowest profitability was found for rotational grazing 
followed by a medium profitability for continuous grazing under opportunistic 
stocking (baseline). The most profitable strategy is continuous grazing under 
conservative stocking. 
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Table 2.3 SNK – post-hoc test on differences in means of total generated profits 
for the four grazing scenarios
Scenario
N Subset for alpha = 0.05
1 2 3
Rotational conservative stocking 300 66.17 Mio Rand
Rotational opportunism 300 66.66 Mio Rand
Continuous opportunism 300 85.65 Mio Rand
Continuous conservative stocking 300
108.24 Mio 
Rand
Significance .086 1.000 1.000
2.6.3 Economic variability
Reducing the variability in HH buffer capacity equates to the social goal of 
decreasing uncertainty and risk in a fluctuating environment. In analyzing the 
variability of HH buffer capacity, we follow the same approach as used for 
profitability. That is, an analysis of variance and sub-sequent post-hoc tests were 
conducted for the four scenarios in order to asses if differences in groups are 
significant. Please note that this approach is complementary to those of 
profitability and equity dynamics of HH buffer capacity presented in the previous 
and forthcoming sections, respectively. Arguably, a certain variability of a 
profitable system might be considered socially more desirable compared to the 
same variability of a less profitable grazing strategy. 
Significant differences between the four grazing strategies with respect to 
variability in HH buffer capacity were found with F(3, 1196) = 16254.798, 
p<0.05. A S-N-K post-hoc test on group differences found three homogenous sub-
groups (Table 2.4). One homogenous sub-group is rotational grazing under 
opportunistic stocking together with continuous grazing under conservative 
stocking. The other two strategies form their own sub-groups. The lowest 
variability in buffer capacity, measured as standard deviation, is found for the 
rotational grazing strategy under conservative stocking. Rotational grazing under 
opportunistic stocking and continuous grazing under conservative stocking show 
a slightly higher variability. The highest variability in HH buffer capacity, and 
thus the least predictable system, emerges with the currently practiced strategy of 
continuous grazing under opportunistic stocking.  
48 2.6 Results
Table 2.4 SNK – post-hoc test on differences in mean variation of HH buffer 
capacity for the four grazing scenarios
Scenario
N Subset for alpha = 0.05
1 2 3
Rotational conservative stocking 300 3262 Rand
Continuous conservative stocking
Rotational opportunism
300
300
4061 Rand
4086 Rand
Continuous opportunism 300 10896 Rand
Significance 1.000 .526 1.000
2.6.4 Equity
The following analysis relates to the social goal of achieving greater equity in the 
distribution of benefits from the rangeland. Here, off-farm income is identified as 
an important supporter of agricultural activities. Thus, richer HH have a 
competitive advantage over poorer HH in establishing and maintaining their herds 
in favourable times and during ecological crisis. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 present HH 
buffer capacity over time for the highest (Figure 2.4) and for the lowest income 
quintile (Figure 2.5) under all four grazing strategies. We present exemplary runs 
instead of averages to not blur the effect of ecological collapse in specific time 
steps. 
The high variability in ecosystem state of the baseline scenario is also reflected 
the evolution of HH buffer capacity for the highest off-farm income quintile. The 
respective HH show significant gains from continuous grazing under 
opportunistic stocking before and after the multi-annual drought period in the 
middle of the simulation. However, overstocking leads to two density-dependent 
collapses of the livestock population during and after the drought. After the 
second collapse, the livestock population takes more than a decade to recover to 
the levels sustained by the other management strategies. Short-term benefits in 
terms of HH buffer capacity were achieved at the cost of lowering the resistance 
and resilience of the ecosystem resulting in poor productivity for a prolonged time 
span after collapse. The three alternative strategies show a positive trend over 
time stabilizing after the drought. The lowest outcome is recorded for rotational 
grazing under conservative stocking and the highest for rotational grazing under 
opportunistic stocking. 
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To summarize, the management alternatives for the currently practiced strategy 
avoid severe population crashes but are not able to generate the large gains from 
continuous grazing under opportunistic stocking during ecologically favourable 
times. Overall, richer HH are able to stabilize or increase their gains from the 
rangeland over time and are able to recover after the multi-annual drought period. 
However, the unrestricted recovery after drought in the baseline scenario creates a 
socio-ecological crisis with a secondary, even longer recovery period for the 
richest HH. 
Figure 2.4 Time series – evolution of HH buffer capacity of the highest income 
quintile for the four grazing scenarios
Figure 2.5 shows the HH buffer capacities for the poorest part of livestock 
producing HH for the four grazing strategies. Analogous to the highest income 
quintile, HH do considerably better by practicing continuous grazing under 
opportunistic stocking compared to the three alternatives until the set-in of the 
drought period. However, a recovery after drought does not lead to new highs in 
HH buffer capacities for the poorest HH. Moreover, the second collapse leads to a 
de-facto extinction of this income group from livestock production. The most 
sustainable level of HH buffer capacity for poor HH is achieved by continuous 
grazing under conservative stocking.  Except for an initial phase at the beginning 
of the simulation, the two rotational grazing scenarios always yield lower values 
for HH buffer capacity with a negative trend towards the end of the simulation. 
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Figure 2.5 Time series – evolution of HH buffer capacity of the lowest income 
quintile for the four grazing scenarios
To summarize, the most viable grazing strategy in terms of long-term 
participation of poor HH in resource appropriation is continuous grazing under 
conservative stocking. The highest income quintile is able to generate an average 
HH buffer capacity under this scenario which is more than five times as high. 
However, it is worth noting that gains from opportunism with continuous grazing 
are tremendous for poor HH until the drought sets in. 
2.7 Discussion
The presented results support earlier findings that stocking rate is the most 
important management variable (O'Reagain and Turner 1992; van Poollen and 
Lacey 1979). Our results show that a maximum cap on herd sizes increases profits 
while preserving a stable ecosystem and yields low economic variability. 
Moreover, this simple measure of a quasi-conservative stocking rate on HH level 
applied to the local context is able to support a more equal distribution of 
rangeland benefits. This management strategy does not involve the costs 
associated with the creation and maintenance of fenced-off paddocks needed for 
rotational grazing. Our results furthermore support empirical studies which could 
not find that rotational grazing increases livestock productivity (Briske et al. 
2008). At the same time, we could show that rest-rotation is an adequate mean to 
maintain ecosystem resilience and resistance also reflected by more stable 
economic outcomes. This does not translate, however, into larger profits when 
aggregated over time for the case presented here. Also, the combination of 
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rotational grazing with conservative stocking could not increase profits above 
those of the baseline scenario. The specific conditions in Sediba might be 
responsible for this as the resource size is limited and a separation in fenced-off 
camps considerably increases competition on smaller land units (Müller et al. 
2007). Live-weight gain is limited by giving resting time to the vegetation. 
However, key resource biomass provided by rested camps functions as a buffer to 
fodder shortage in drought years (Vetter 2013). The restriction of livestock to 
separated camps moderately increases mortality, decreases reproduction and 
body-weight compared to continuous grazing in favourable years. The maximum 
stocking rate per HH used in this model is thus not a binding constraint for most 
HH in the rotational grazing scenario and has thus only a marginal effect on 
outcomes. The resulting lower stocking rate combined with "reserved" forage on 
rested camps offers, however, a higher probability of herd survival in 
unfavourable years. Moreover, the increased selling rate due to the conservative 
stocking rate under continuous grazing outperforms profits generated from 
opportunistic stocking as re-acquisition of animals is too costly. 
Although it is tempting to arrive at a clear-cut management recommendation 
based on our results, any such attempt must be viewed in the light of local and 
social context (Vetter 2013). Under the absence of informal institutions regulating 
resource use, a social dilemma is evident. That is, people don’t want to be 
externally forced to restrict their herd sizes considering past experiences during 
apartheid. At the same time, villagers expect significant gains in profits from the 
introduction of rotational grazing, which has been reported earlier (Heady 1961). 
However, it is unlikely that villagers will carry the maintenance and institutional 
costs associated with rotational grazing rendering any investment in the 
infrastructure useless. To summarize, a restriction of herd sizes is not wanted by 
villagers and rotational grazing will not meet their economic expectations. 
However, the tremendous gains of opportunism with continuous grazing in terms 
of peeks in buffer capacity indicate that there might be a lot to win if livestock is 
sold prior to collapse. That is, our results suggest that a tracking scenario has 
some potential with respect to profitability and might be a potential path-way to 
tackle the described dilemma. Tracking would involve monitoring stocking rates 
and ecosystem state as well as opportunities to sell and re-buy large parts of the 
52 2.7 Discussion
herd. However, the investigation of tracking was beyond the scope of this paper. 
We believe that the latter is a worthy endeavour for future research.
Here, further research is needed to derive early-warning indicators for imminent 
population crashes, optimal de- and restocking strategies and a careful benchmark 
of socio-ecological outcomes for this management scheme against other 
management alternatives. The success of tracking would furthermore require the 
integration of local markets into national or global supply chains in order to not 
distort prices due to over-supply or demand. 
The applicability of our findings to this case is, however, limited as the model 
ignores any informal institutions regulating resource governance in non-obvious 
ways. The next chapter in this thesis is devoted to the identification of 
mechanisms of informal institutions and their translation into quantifiable 
measures for the case under investigation.
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Appendix A: Links to online appendix 
Template HH survey – Livestock owners http://www.fg1501db.uni-koeln.de/index.php?navi=8&id=16
Coding scheme HH survey – Livestock owners http://www.fg1501db.uni-koeln.de/index.php?navi=8&id=36
Data HH survey – Livestock owners http://www.fg1501db.uni-koeln.de/index.php?navi=8&id=37
Input data file – Livestock owners http://www.fg1501db.uni-koeln.de/index.php?navi=8&id=43
Template HH survey – HH not owning livestock http://www.fg1501db.uni-koeln.de/index.php?navi=8&id=17
Coding scheme HH survey – HH not owning livestock http://www.fg1501db.uni-koeln.de/index.php?navi=8&id=38
Data HH survey – HH not owning livestock http://www.fg1501db.uni-koeln.de/index.php?navi=8&id=44
Weather file
Extended figure of rangeland submodel
Parameter input file rangeland submodel
http://www.fg1501db.uni-koeln.de/index.php?navi=8&id=42
http://www.fg1501db.uni-koeln.de/index.php?navi=8&id=45
http://www.fg1501db.uni-koeln.de/index.php?navi=8&id=46
Appendix B: State variables and parameters of entities 
State variables Parameters
Livestock producing HH Livestock, farm-income, expenditures, 
savings, reciprocity, cooperativeness, 
norm compliance
Off-farm income, HH size, age
HH not owning HH Expenditures, savings Off-farm income, HH size, age
Livestock Age, bodyweight, #calves Sex
Rangeland Basal area, green standing crop, senescent 
standing crop
Temperature, precipitation, 
irradiance, wind speed
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Chapter 3
Cooperation and Collapse in a 
communal livestock production 
SES10
Abstract: Institutional arrangements are considered necessary for successfully 
governing the commons. They are considered to be most effective if they are self-
organized rather than imposed from outside. However, endogenous institutional 
arrangements, such as local norms, are specific to a particular socio-ecological 
system (SES). This paper presents a SES model of communal livestock producers 
in South Africa. Its bio-physical component accounts for the impact of biotic and 
abiotic factors on livestock population. The social agent-based component models 
individual and socially determined behaviour, the latter of which is a social norm 
specific to the case. Model results show that when cooperative agents obey and 
sanction the norm, there is less likelihood of SES collapse in terms of livestock 
population crashes. However, cooperation among agents only emerges in times of 
ecological crisis where social reorganization is fostered. The crisis creates an 
opportunity for initializing a self-enforcing process of mutual cooperation. Model 
specifications are based on survey data, and agents were parameterized according 
10 This part is published as Rasch, S., Heckelei, T., Oomen R. and Naumann C. (2014): Cooperation 
and collapse in a communal livestock production SES model – A case from South Africa, 
Environmental Modelling & Software, in press, doi:10.1016/j.envsoft.2014.12.008
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to individual household data. A sensitivity analysis shows that this empirical 
heterogeneity cannot be reduced without changing model outcomes. 
Keywords: SES, agent-based modelling, rangelands, norms, cooperative 
behaviour, bounded rationality, South Africa
JEL classification codes: Q2, Z13, C9, C63
3.1 Introduction
Recent debates in rangeland science have focused on resolving the dichotomy 
between equilibrium and disequilibrium models (Vetter 2005, p.334). Equilibrium 
models stress the importance of density-dependent livestock mortality that results 
from competition for forage. The contrasting idea of disequilibrium models is that 
mortality is primarily density-independent and driven by abiotic factors. Although 
rangeland science now acknowledges that both elements are evident in 
rangelands, an integrated approach still misses a third element (Vetter 2005, 
p.323). This element is the social dimension, which is interwoven with the 
ecological system. Such a coupled system, accounting for both social and 
ecological complexity, is described as a socio-ecological system (Gross et al. 
2006, p.1265). Social complexity is evident when social interactions contribute to 
relevant outcomes at the system level, such as where the decisions of several 
individuals contribute to resource appropriation. A classical case for social 
complexity arising from multi-stakeholder settings is a communal livestock 
production system (Milner-Gulland et al. 2006, p.24). If common access to the 
resource is restricted to the community, it is characterized as a common-pool 
good (Ostrom 2005, p.24). 
A characteristic threat associated with common-pool resources is ecological 
degradation due to over-appropriation. In such cases, the actions of rational 
individuals have external effects on other actors, which was predicted to result in 
a “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968).  However, the classical view on the 
inevitability of the tragedy of the commons has also changed (Deadman 1999; 
Feeny et al. 1990; Allsopp et al. 2007). This paradigm shift is based on the 
acknowledgement that actors are not necessarily “rational egoists” (Ostrom 2005, 
p.101). Economic experiments have shown that participants are “more trusting 
than homo economicus” (Heckbert et al. 2010, p.41), are strong reciprocators 
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(Gintis 2000, p.313) and are thus conditional co-operators (Gintis 2000, p.316) 
rather than purely self-interested free-riders in common-pool resource settings. 
An essential element for successfully governing the commons is the existence of 
institutional arrangements constraining individual behaviour (Vetter 2013; 
Ostrom 2005, p.137). Ostrom (2005, p.137) presents an institutional syntax based 
on the notion that institutional arrangement can be distinguished as shared 
strategies, norms or rules. The three types of institutions differ in how they treat 
sanctioning of violations of the arrangement. A rule is enforced with a formal 
sanction; a norm by normative sanctioning and a shared strategy is not enforced. 
Normative sanctioning does not include a formal fee but is expressed in 
disapproval from others. Moreover, institutional arrangements are seen to be more 
effective in the long run if they are revised and enforced by the community 
instead of being externally imposed (Frey and Jegen 2001).  
SES modelling has emerged as a new field to study the interplay of ecology with 
the social dimension of SES. According to Schlüter et al. (2012),
“Modeling SESs as coevolving systems acknowledges that history matters, i.e., 
the system’s dynamics are path-dependent, such that previous developments and 
states of the system constrain possible future developments” (2012, p. 48)
A prominent example of an SES model applied to rangeland systems that 
considers the social dimension is in Walker and Janssen (2002), which was based 
on a model from Janssen et al. (2000). Here, the authors find that rangelands, 
including their livestock and managers, are complex adaptive systems (CAS) 
characterized by individuality of components, localized interactions and 
autonomous processes. The authors stress that future research needs to better 
understand “the rules that govern change and the conditions under which change 
occurs” in those self-organizing systems (Walker and Janssen 2002, p. 724). 
Other SES rangeland models have addressed pastoralist behaviour (Milner-
Gulland et al. 2006), assessed management alternatives for rangelands (Müller et 
al. 2007; Campbell et al. 2000; Beukes et al. 2002) and identified robust strategies 
for rangeland management (Janssen et al. 2004). Gross et al.’s rangeland model 
emphasised the interaction between learning and environmental heterogeneity 
(Gross et al. 2006). An ecological-economic model by Jakoby et al. (2014) found 
that individual risk preferences of rangeland managers have to be taken into 
account to find a viable strategy. The assessment of HH (Household) viability in 
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terms of risk in the rangeland context was modelled by (Martin et al. 2014). 
Another rangeland model focuses on the importance of gift-giving institutions for 
risk pooling (Aktipis et al. 2011). The impact of underlying rationality 
assumptions is another important element (Rouchier et al. 2001), and SES models 
typically assume bounded rational decision making (Schlüter et al. 2012).
However, most SES models that account for institutional aspects and social rules 
impose them as exogenous constraints for individual behaviour (Schlüter et al. 
2012). Endogenously evolving institutional processes have only been modelled by 
a few scholars and have seldom been applied to real-world SES cases. Early 
examples encompass the computational study of norms e.g., by Staller and Petta 
(2001) as well as by Saam and Harrer (1999). Saam and Harrer (1999) focus on 
“norms as solutions to problems of inequality [...]” and operationalize norms in 
this context as behavioural constraints on interacting, artificial agents. Smajgl et 
al. (2010) modelled the evolution of institutional arrangements between farmers 
extracting water from a common pool. Both Ebenhöh and Pahl-Wostl (2008) and 
Castillo and Saysel (2005) modelled the endogenous formation of cooperation 
based on norms of reciprocity and trust. Another agent-based model by Wilson et 
al. showed that self-organizing processes can result in the emergence of 
successful collective action based on competition (Wilson et al. 2007). The 
collective action restrains individuals from unsustainable resource appropriation. 
The spontaneous emergence of a resource-sharing convention was modelled by 
Thebaud and Locatelli (2001). Using evolutionary game theory, Tavoni et al. 
(2012) modelled endogenously emerging cooperation in an artificial common 
pool resource setting driven by other-regarding preferences and the pressure of 
the conformist.
The models cited above are important steps towards a better understanding of 
endogenously evolving institutions based on social interaction. 
Our aim is to make a further step in this direction by modelling an endogenously 
evolving social process in a real-world SES. We investigate the impact of a norm 
in a livestock producing community in South Africa, focusing on the social 
dimension of the SES. An agent-based model is used to test the basic hypothesis 
that endogenously evolving institutional arrangements can alleviate the threat of 
degradation and system collapse in a rangeland system. The emergence of self-
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governance has already been found to support this hypothesis for a fishery case in 
Wilson et al. (2007). A second research question examines the circumstances and 
conditions under which the modelled norm evolves. Here, we are interested in 
small changes propagating through the system and leading to systemic changes 
(Abel et al. 2006). Systemic changes are measured with outcomes at the system 
level. We differentiate between system configurations that sustain the link 
between the social and the ecological dimension and those that are marked by a 
loss of the link. The link itself is the livestock population, which allows the use of 
the ecosystem services provided by the common-pool resource. The loss of this 
link represents a change in identity (Cumming and Collier 2005) and is thus a 
collapse of the SES under investigation. With the aim to contribute to the field of 
empirical agent-based modelling, the model is further analysed with respect to the 
effect of empirical detail in parameterization on the emergence of cooperation 
(Janssen and Ostrom 2006; Smajgl and Barreteau 2014). Cooperation is 
understood as collectively obeying a norm and normatively sanctioning norm 
violators such that they are drawn into mutual cooperation. 
The next section (3.2) presents a brief description of the underlying case followed 
by a (3.3) model description based on the ODD+D protocol. Thereafter, (3.4) 
results are presented and (3.5) discussed in the light of the existing literature on 
collective action and norms in common-pool resource settings.
3.2 Case Study
Sediba, a village community near Thaba Nchu, South Africa, is modelled here. 
Sediba’s residents use a 2500 ha rangeland as commonage for beef cattle 
production.  However, only 80 of the 162 HH are currently engaged in livestock 
husbandry. The region is categorized as a semi-arid grassland biome (Rutherford 
and Westfall 1994), with a mean precipitation of 537 mm per annum (Swemmer 
et al. 2007; Woyessa et al. 2006). The vegetation belongs to the “Moist Cool 
Highveld Grassland Type” (Bredenkamp and van Rooyen 1996), which covers 
the central eastern parts of the Free State province. Dominant species are 
perennial C4 bunchgrasses, such as Themeda triandra, Eragrostis lehmanniana
and Digitaria eriantha, and hence, it is commonly referred to as “sweet veld” 
(Palmer and Ainslie 2005), with sweet referring to relatively good palatability of 
the vegetation and veld being a South African term for rangeland. Herd sizes of 
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HH are generally small with a maximum of 25 cattle (Journal Appendix A). In 
accordance with Berzborn’s (2007, p.679) findings, livestock is not perceived as a 
main source of income but as a “top-up” to off-farm income. HH income is 
mainly generated by state grants and remittances. Income from wage labour is 
generally low due to scarce employment opportunities. Livestock production is 
predominantly a phenomenon of the middle class, which is more likely to own 
livestock than poorer or richer HHs. There are no formal institutions regulating 
stocking rates in Sediba. However, a social norm restricts the over-usage of the 
resource. This norm and its underlying social processes are described in the 
ODD+D protocol presented in the next section.
3.3 ODD+D protocol
This section utilizes a recent update of the ODD protocol (Grimm et al. 2010) for 
agent-based model description. The ODD+D protocol has been developed to 
better describe human decision making (Müller et al. 2013). The ODD protocol is 
structured in a hierarchical way with respect to the complexity of model 
description. It starts with a general overview, reveals design concepts and 
concludes with a detailed presentation of the model. The resulting redundancy in 
the presentation is thought to be outweighed by enhanced replicability and 
comparability. Here, we follow the author’s recommendation to present the 
overview and design concepts and to provide the full ODD+D protocol, including 
details, as an online appendix (doi:10.1016/j.envsoft.2014.12.008).
3.3.1 Overview
Purpose
The purpose of the model is to investigate how social norms affect the stability of 
a communal livestock production SES in South Africa. The underlying hypothesis 
is that the SES faces the threat of collapse in the absence of institutions regulating 
appropriation from the common-pool resource. The institutional arrangement is a 
norm to “not have much more cattle compared to other families”. Although it is 
not targeted at preserving system stability, this norm might have positive effects 
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on sustainability or resource use because it slows the growth rates of herds. The 
model was built to answer two research questions.
1. Does a “resource-blind” norm have a stabilizing effect on SES dynamics? 
RQ1
2. Under which conditions does norm compliance emerge? RQ2
Another objective is to detect whether heterogeneity in agent attributes derived 
from a HH survey significantly impacts model outcomes. That is, does the use of 
empirical data on a detailed level add information to the model or can complexity 
be reduced by using averages or random values? 
The model was designed for scientists who study the impact of social norms on 
SES dynamics in common-pool resource settings. 
Entities, state variables and scales
Social agents are aggregated on the HH level. Two HH agent types are present in 
the model: a livestock producing HH agent and a HH agent who does not own 
livestock. Cattle being heifers, cows or bulls are representative of the livestock 
agent. A fourth entity is the common rangeland providing the ecosystem service 
of forage production. Biomass production is modelled in kg per ha. 
Both HH agents are characterized by income, expenditures, savings, HH size and 
age of the HH head. Livestock producing HH agents are additionally 
characterized by the number and type of livestock agents owned, memory of past 
profits, cooperativeness, reciprocity, norm compliance and selling rule.  HH 
agents can switch their type during the simulation depending on entry and exit 
rules. Livestock agents have a bodyweight, age, gender and, in the case of cows, a 
value for the number of calves. Important state variables of the rangeland are (1) 
biomass of green shoots, (2) senescent biomass, and (3) basal area. A list of state 
variables and parameters can be found in the appendix (Journal Appendix B). 
References to the data files are given in the next section describing the empirical 
background.
Space is implicitly considered in the consumption and production of forage per 
ha. Here the resource size is constant but herd sizes vary over time. The model 
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runs with daily (ecosystem) and monthly (social system) time steps over a period 
of 100 years.  
Process overview and scheduling
The rangeland entity produces biomass on a daily basis, which is reduced by 
monthly forage consumption. Livestock agents update monthly live-weight from 
forage consumption. All HH agents predict their expenditures at the beginning of 
each month. They decide on entering or are potentially forced to exit livestock 
production every month. They decide if they obey a rule prescribed by a norm and 
whether to sell livestock on a monthly basis. 
Livestock is born and dies in one month of the year. Livestock producing HH 
agents draw a new heuristic selling rule in every fourth year (production cycle).  
Figure 3.1 depicts the time intervals and order of scheduled events. 
Figure 3.1 Model flow - scheduling 
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3.3.2 Design concepts
Theoretical and empirical background
A living standards and measurement HH survey was conducted in four villages of 
the rural area of Thaba Nchu in South Africa (Worldbank 2013). It encompassed 
350 HH and was adapted to the local context. Individual data were aggregated on 
the HH level. The survey was administered to livestock producers and to HH not 
owning livestock. For the village of Sediba, the survey covered the whole 
population of livestock owing HH. The social mechanisms driving the dynamics 
of the modelled norm, as well as the norm itself, were face-validated by an 
anthropologic researcher who lived in the village for 9 months (pers. comm. 
Christiane Naumann). Additionally, vegetation and soil samples were taken in 
two villages to calibrate the rangeland model. All field activities were conducted 
by a research group (http://www.fg1501.uni-koeln.de/) funded by the German 
Research Foundation from 2010 till 2013. HH survey templates, coding schemes, 
survey data, weather data, input data files used in the model and the full ODD+D 
protocol can be found in the journal appendix
(doi:10.1016/j.envsoft.2014.12.008).
The hypothesis to be tested with the model was informed by the theory of 
collective action (Ostrom 2003) in the context of rangeland systems. Regarding 
the latter, the model was designed to account for the impact of abiotic (climatic) 
and biotic (competition) factors and their combined effect on herd survival (Vetter 
2005). The ecosystem design (biomass growth) was guided by the need to account 
for climatic variability in semi-arid areas (McAllister et al. 2011, p.1). The most 
important abiotic driver for semi-arid rangelands is sporadic rainfall with high 
precipitation on a few days during the wet season. This was accounted through 
the daily temporal resolution of the ecological model.  The ecosystem model 
constitutes the adoption of the Lingra model to semi-arid rangelands 
(Schapendonk et al. 1998). Livestock dynamics in terms of mortality and 
reproduction are based on the idea of over-compensatory growth, forage quantity 
and quality, as modelled in Gross et al. (2006). Stocking densities emerge from 
the interaction of ecosystem, herd and social dynamics.
The general concept underlying the design of the social dimension is based on the 
insight that institutional arrangements constitute constraints for individual 
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behaviour (Ostrom 2005, p.137).  Accordingly, the social model is designed in a 
two-tier manner. Individuals know and perform actions in an isolated fashion to 
pursue individual goals. However, individual actions can be overruled by a 
collective action in case an individual is drawn into mutual cooperation (Ebenhöh 
and Pahl-Wostl 2008).  
Agents are assumed to be bounded rational (Carpenter and Brock 2004, p.5; 
Ebenhöh 2006; Ebenhöh and Pahl-Wostl 2008; Feola and Binder 2010, p.2324; 
Schlüter and Pahl-Wostl 2007; Schlüter et al. 2012, p.231; Janssen and Ostrom 
2006, p.6). This accounts for the individual as well as for the collective level. On 
an individual level, agents do not have full information and lack the 
computational ability to plan decisions in a fully rational manner. They use 
adaptive heuristics instead. On the collective level, agents are conditional 
cooperators in cases where normative sanctioning is perceived to be more costly 
compared to the loss of monetary value (Ostrom 2003). Thus, they are not rational 
egoists. 
Bounded rationality was assumed on the basis of empirical evidence from the 
case study. The HH survey revealed that respondents use simple heuristics or 
even random choice for selling cattle. Moreover, many respondents (47%) stated 
that a significant increase in their herd size would result in a form of normative 
sanctioning. That is, others would “become envious and make problems”. Thus, 
decision makers are considering norms of reciprocity. The existence of a strong 
social valuation of negative reciprocity was confirmed by the anthropologic
researcher of the team. She observed negative reciprocity in the social interactions 
during her nine months stay in Sediba. One villager even stated that “others
would kill me if I double my herd size”.
Additionally, the high climatic variability in semi-arid areas imposes constraints 
to full rationality in terms of information availability. Here, information about 
ecological outcomes is scarce and uncertain. The same holds for actions of other 
HH in a common-pool setting. 
Other structurally relevant, but not focal, decisions are HH expenditures and the 
decision to enter into livestock husbandry. Available data allowed for the 
statistical estimation of expenditures and entries in the form of regressions. 
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Survey data from the village of Sediba was used to specify the number, types, 
state variables and parameters of HH agents in the model (Journal Appendix B). 
Individual decision making
This section distinguishes among four decision-making models. The first two 
relate to concepts behind modelling HH expenditures and entries. The second set 
depicts the economically and socially driven decisions to sell livestock. 
All HH agents decide on how much to spend from the monthly HH budget on the 
basis of income and HH size. HH agents that do not own livestock decide whether 
to buy a cow to enter livestock production. However, HH agents need to have 
sufficient savings to do so. HH expenditures are determined by a linear regression 
on the HH size and income, which does not account for uncertainty in the 
prediction. Uncertainty in the entry decision is, however, reflected by a logistic 
regression predicting the probability to enter. HH only enter if a random number 
drawn from a uniform distribution is lower or equal than this probability. HH exit 
livestock production as a consequence of livestock mortality or the selling 
decision. In the decisions on expenditures, entries and in the case of exits, no 
temporal or spatial aspects are considered.
The decision to sell livestock is determined by individual goals, which may 
change depending on aggregated decision-making on the community level. Thus, 
decision-making with respect to sales of livestock takes place on two levels. 
Livestock producers decide if, how much and what type of livestock to sell. 
Survey data revealed that 83% of all sales are leaving the village, as livestock is 
mostly sold to butchers or speculators that regularly visit the villages (Journal 
Appendix C). Livestock sold within the village is often slaughtered by the buyers 
for ritual use during funerals. Only a minority of cattle is sold to HH who want to 
enter livestock production, and HH do not buy livestock to increase their herds11. 
Thus, sold livestock reduces grazing pressure and does not simply change 
ownership within the village. Producers decide which selling rule to use 
11 Less than 2% of the total herd size was bought by HH during the last 12 months before the 
interview (Appendix C)
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according to the economic success during past production cycles. The probability 
of keeping a distinct selling heuristic increases with the economic success 
associated with the heuristic. A lower profit of the past production cycle raises the 
likelihood of experimenting with the selling rule for the next cycle. The objective 
is to maximize economic success, which is performed by inductive reasoning on 
the basis of limited information. The described decision making process is 
implemented with a genetic algorithm (Goldberg and Holland 1988). Here, 
heuristic rules and values for applying these rules are encoded. Economic success 
determines fitness values of solution chromosomes. Solution chromosomes are 
chosen depending on a roulette-wheel draw with probabilities weighted according 
to the fitness values. The random draw of solution chromosomes mimics 
uncertainty in the decision of rule adoption and updating of fitness values reduces 
uncertainty. The temporal aspect plays a role in the agent’s memory of past 
economic successes. The decision model does not account for spatial aspects. 
Additional sales are triggered if producers obey a norm and have a herd size 
above a threshold prescribed by the norm. The implementation of cooperative 
behaviour in the context of a norm is inspired by the model of Ebenhöh and Pahl-
Wostl (2008).
In their model of bounded rational agents engaging in collective action, the 
authors differentiate among three types of agent behaviour: (1) cooperative, (2) 
defective and (3) wavering between the first two. They focus on the latter, which 
stresses that social embededdness matters as outlined in Ostrom’s theory of 
collective action (Ostrom 2003). Ostrom states that “individuals enter situations 
with an initial probability of using reciprocity based on their own prior training 
and experiences” (Ostrom 2003, p.49). Reciprocity means to “[...] react to the 
positive actions of others with positive responses and to the negative actions of 
others with negative responses” (Ostrom 2003, p.42). Reciprocity is strongly path-
dependent on the trust that others will be reciprocators. Ebenhöh and Pahl-Wostl 
enrich this conceptual model by additional attributes, such as cooperativeness. 
The degree of cooperativeness among individuals differs according to their own 
preferences and is expressed by public commitment to an agreement or by 
signalling the assurance to be trustworthy in terms of obeying institutional 
arrangements (Ostrom 2003, p.45). However, cooperativeness can also change if 
agents lack “the assurance from others that their trust will be returned” (Ostrom 
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2003, p.45). In short, cooperativeness is degraded if others are violating 
institutional prescriptions in form of rules, norms or shared strategies. Ebenhöh 
and Pahl-Wostl model this behaviour with agent attributes and heuristics. Agents 
have, in addition to the named attributes, values for expected reciprocity and 
expected cooperativeness that correspond to the trust of individuals in that others 
will be reciprocators and cooperators, respectively. Trust in others then feeds back 
into its own attributes, which determine conditional cooperativeness. Agents with 
a high conditional cooperativeness, based on reciprocity and cooperativeness, 
have a higher probability to be drawn into mutual cooperation which in turn 
increases the reputation of the group (trust).
In SES, human actors rely on norms being “highly context specific social 
institutions” (McAllister et al. 2011). In the SES model presented here, as 
opposed to Ebenhöh and Pahl-Wostl’s model (2008), agents cooperate with 
respect to a context-specific norm and are only drawn into mutual cooperation if 
the situation is vivid and promising. According to Ostrom (2005), vividness 
relates to the acuteness of a situation. That is, a high vividness increases the 
likelihood for action because “paying attention is costly” (Ostrom 2005, p.107).  
We further assume that the situation must also be promising in the sense that 
agents believe to be able to draw others into mutual cooperation. Both aspects 
relate directly to observable outcomes of resource extraction, which has been 
shown to influence cooperation (Tavoni et al. 2012). That is, agents consider the 
inequality of herd sizes and the severity of norm violations in their decision-
making process. The latter is measured as the number of livestock in large herds. 
Both livestock-related variables are strongly impacted by forage availability on 
the common rangeland. Thus, the collective action modelled here accounts for 
SES feedbacks.
The incentives for agents to cooperate in the normative process are fourfold. First, 
agents are inequality averse, which increases the probability for those agents to 
put up social pressure to reduce inequality. Second, agents want to avoid 
normative sanctioning. Third, once they have publically committed to obey a 
norm, agents try to deter others from violating the norm, as they feel that this is 
just.  Fourth, a high degree of norm violations decreases social pressure, as agents 
have lower expectations that violators will obey the norm. Agents are 
heterogeneous in their values for the parameter of initial cooperativeness. Details 
3.3 ODD+D protocol 73
on the implementation of this process can be found in the full ODD+D protocol in 
the journal appendix (doi:10.1016/j.envsoft.2014.12.008).
This set-up represents a threshold model similar to innovation-diffusion models 
(Deffuant et al. 2005; Schreinemachers et al. 2009; Berger 2001; Abrahamson and 
Rosenkopf 1997), wherein early adopters trigger cascading effects of innovation-
diffusion in the population. The process of social diffusion is influenced by 
endogenously evolving norm violations and inequality. There is a temporal lag of 
information diffusion. That is, agents consider the relevant decision variables of 
the past month in their current decision. Uncertainty and spatial aspects are not 
considered in this decision model.
Learning
The selling decision on an individual level makes use of reinforcement learning. 
A distinction is made between heuristic rules and the values used for applying 
these rules. Here, agents decide to sell bulls and cows according to their age, cows 
according to the number of calves or according to which of the two conditions is 
satisfied first12. The genetic algorithm produces new combinations of heuristics 
and values by means of crossover and mutation. Fitter rule-value combinations 
survive during the process. Here, fitness refers to economic success of rule-value 
combinations. Thus, agents using this decision model aim to increase profits. 
However, they are not optimizers because they use the non-optimizing strategy of 
reinforcement learning (Gigerenzer and Selten 2002). Agents do not compute an 
optimal strategy beforehand, rather they choose what worked best in the past. 
With Wilson et al.’s words, agents are “assumed to be boundedly rational, profit 
maximisers” (Wilson et al. 2007, p. 15213).
Individual sensing 
HH agents know the share of cooperating HH agents, how unequal herd sizes are 
and how severe norm violations are.
12 Ranges for values are derived from survey data (Appendix C)
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Individual prediction
HH agents predict their HH expenditures and their probability of entering into 
livestock husbandry. They furthermore implicitly predict the chances of drawing 
others into mutual cooperation based on the severity of norm violations.
Interaction
Interactions of livestock agents are indirect via the rangeland. Cattle compete for 
forage. Similarly, livestock producing HH agents compete with each other 
indirectly via resource appropriation of their herds. Moreover, they interact 
directly by normative sanctioning. HH agents not owning livestock are not 
interacting. 
Collectives
There are no agent collectives in the model.
Heterogenity
Livestock-producing HH agents are heterogeneous in the use of selling heuristics.
Stochasticity
Random numbers are used in assessing if probability thresholds of the following 
variables are reached: cattle mortality and births, HH entering livestock 
production and the chosen selling heuristics.
Observation
The percentages of co-operators in the normative process and livestock mortality 
are collected on a monthly and on a yearly basis, respectively. Those variables 
were used to identify system collapse and the emergence of cooperation. 
Emergence of cooperation, measured as an incident of one-hundred percent of 
norm followers, was also used as a binary measurement variable for the 
sensitivity analysis investigating the effect of empirical heterogeneity on model 
outcomes. Other variables collected for visual analysis are the gini coefficient 
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(Pyatt 1976) of herd sizes, stocking density (ha/LSU), basal area (%) and green 
standing crop (kg/ha).
3.3.3 Details
The details of the model and its submodels can be found in the full ODD+D in the 
journal appendix (doi:10.1016/j.envsoft.2014.12.008). The source code for the 
model is published on openabm.org 
https://www.openabm.org/model/4293/version/1/view.
3.4 Results
In the following section, the results from a two-stage model analysis are 
presented. First, a typical run in the baseline configuration is described. This is 
followed by a descriptive analysis with respect to the frequencies of cooperation 
and SES collapse. Thereafter, two runs are presented to exemplify relationships 
between social and ecological variables in the cases of collapse and cooperation.  
In a second step, a sensitivity analysis based on design principles of experiments 
(DOE) is presented (Sanchez and Lucas 2002). The latter investigates the impact 
of empirical complexity in parameterization on model outcomes. 
3.4.1 Baseline configuration
The baseline configuration for a typical run is specified according to individual 
HH data. That is, the heterogeneity of HH, reflected in the data, is directly 
assigned to agent attributes and rules. All livestock-producing agents are using 
heterogeneous and adaptive heuristics as they implement the genetic algorithm for 
the selling decision. Every run encompasses 100 years. The run starts with 80 
livestock producing HH and 83 HH not owning livestock. There is no in- or 
outmigration. HH dynamics are not considered to avoid increasing the model 
complexity. Thus, the demographics remain constant. Prices, off-farm-incomes 
and HH structures are fixed. In total, 443 cattle are initially grazing on the 
rangeland. A warm-up period of 59 months is used for initializing the rangeland 
model. During warm-up, no grazing takes place as the rangeland model must first 
establish root biomass. The agent based model is started after this initial phase.
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Cooperation and Collapse in the baseline configuration
To answer the first research question, which examines the effect of the norm on 
SES dynamics, we defined two basic configurations for measurement; 
cooperation and collapse. 
For a single run, cooperation has emerged if there was an incidence during the 
run with 100% norm followers. We use the term cooperation (italic) to describe 
the public commitment of all agents to follow the norm and to cooperate in 
sanctioning norm violators. The simulation results show that the measure of an 
incidence of 100% norm followers captures 99.5% of all runs where the threshold 
of 61% norm followers was crossed in an earlier time step. A share of norm 
followers of above 81% leads to cooperation in any run. 
Similarly, a collapse occurred if a total cattle population crash due an ecological 
crisis (100% mortality) was detected during the run. Collapse describes a state 
where the link between the social and the ecological system is lost. The defining 
link between the systems under investigation is the utilization of ecosystem 
services mediated via livestock production. The results show that any collapse in 
the simulation is path-dependent because it only emerges in later time steps of any 
run. The minimum year in which collapse occurred was year 52 (out of 1000 
runs). Here, herd sizes slowly build up to an unsustainable critical threshold 
relative to the ecological condition.
Both cooperation and collapse are uncertain due to stochasticity in selling rules, 
mortality and reproduction. Small differences in earlier time steps can propagate 
through the system and lead to systemic change with respect to the final system 
configuration. To filter stochastic effects, a batch run encompassing 1000 runs 
was conducted and analysed. Descriptive statistics on the frequencies of four 
possible system configurations are presented in table 3.1. The four system 
configurations result from the combinations of cases of collapse and cooperation
and their opposite states. That is, each run can be classified as cooperation, 
defection, collapse and stability. 
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Table 3.1 Frequency table of system configurations - 1000 runs
System configurations Cooperation Defection 
Collapse 1% 42% 43%
Stability 38% 19% 57%
 39% 61% 100%
Table 3.1 shows that cooperation emerges in 39% of the runs. Collapse occurred 
in 43% of the runs. However, a collapse only occurred in 1% of the runs where 
cooperation had emerged. In contrast, a collapse occurred most frequently (42%) 
in runs where cooperation had not emerged. Moreover, most cases of stable 
system configurations (38%), as the absence of system collapse, emerged in cases 
where agents fully cooperated. 
To summarise, cooperation has a stabilizing effect on SES dynamics by 
significantly reducing the threat of population crashes (RQ1). However, two facts 
are notable. First, defection does not necessarily lead to a collapse. Second, 
cooperation emerges in less than 50% of the cases. Both facts indicate a 
sensitivity of the model towards differences in how variables evolve during the 
runs. 
To inspect the conditions under which cooperation emerges (RQ2), two example 
runs are presented in the next sub-section
Dynamic patterns of cooperation and collapse
Figures 3.2 to 3.6 compare the social and ecological variables of a run where 
cooperation (black lines) has emerged and a run where a collapse (grey lines) 
occurred. Several typical patterns are described below.
The system starts with moderate inequality (Gini herd sizes), low severity and no 
norm followers. Agents with the highest values of initial cooperativeness build up 
social pressure as inequality is rising. However, the severity of norm violations is 
increasing even faster, which suppresses other agents’ participation in the 
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collective action. The severity increases to a point (year 49), at which time all 
agents refrain from cooperation (Figure 3.2). 
Figure 3.2 Cooperation, Severity and Inequality - Cooperation vs. Collapse
A rainy period (Figure 3.3) from year 45 till year 57 increases forage production 
and allows herds to grow substantially (Figure 3.6).  However, total forage intake 
results in a steady decrease of basal area (Figure 3.4). The basal area describes the 
percentage of soil covered by plant surface, and it is a common indicator for 
rangeland degradation in South Africa (Snyman 2005).
Figure 3.3 Rainfall
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Around year 57, the ecological crisis actualizes (Figures 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6) in the 
combination of low rangeland quality, low forage productivity and high grazing 
pressure in terms of livestock units (LSU) per ha.
Figure 3.4 Basal area - Cooperation vs. Collapse
Figure 3.5 Green standing crop - Cooperation vs. Collapse
During this crisis, a high proportion of animals die off because forage production 
is not sufficient to feed the large herd (Figure 3.6). 
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Figure 3.6 Stocking densities LSU/ha - Cooperation vs. Collapse
The SES crisis is the critical phase for the emergence of cooperation. The death 
of substantial parts of the herd reduces both the inequality and the severity of 
norm violations. In cases where norm violations are not severe but inequality 
remains relatively high, the norm can fully evolve. Once established, the process 
is self-enforcing because normative sanctioning is at a maximum. There are still 
100% norm followers at the end of the simulation when inequality is reduced 
back to its initial level (Figure 3.2). Additional sales, triggered by the action 
prescribed by the norm, result in slower rates of herd growths after the crises 
(Figure 3.6). The rangeland can recover (Figure 3.4) and provides sufficient 
forage (Figure 3.5) for herd survival. 
In the absence of cooperation, the resource degrades to a point where forage 
production is insufficient (Figures 3.4 and 3.5) for herd survival and a SES 
collapse occurs (Figure 3.6). The collective action driven by the norm 
circumvented a second and more extreme SES crisis.
Figures 3.2-3.6 were computed from example runs. An investigation of the full 
run set revealed that cooperation is indeed an alternative stable state. In 61% of 
all runs, a very high share agents followed the norm until the end of the 
simulation. On average, norm-following remained stable for 86% of the 
remaining time until the end of the simulation, with an average duration of 334 
months. During this time, the average percentage of norm followers was 96% and 
never below 61%. Cooperation never emerged if a critical threshold of 51% norm 
followers was not crossed. The emergence of cooperation is always erratic and 
occurs within a few years.
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3.4.1 DOE and sensitivity analysis
In the preceding sub-sections, cooperation was identified as having a stabilizing 
effect on SES dynamics over the investigated time span. However, the emergence 
of cooperation is sensitive to path-dependent developments.  Next, we investigate 
the model’s sensitivity towards assumptions made with respect to agent 
parameterization from empirical data. In this subsection, we present a sensitivity 
analysis intended to investigate the impact of model assumptions on the 
likelihood of cooperation emerging, with a special focus on complexity and the 
necessary level of detail derived from empirical data. We would like to know if 
the empirically derived heterogeneity of agent attributes adds an explanatory 
value to model outcomes or if this complexity can be reduced without losing 
information.
A design of experiments (DOE) approach was conducted to capture the reaction 
surface of the model. There are several experimental designs established in the 
literature. Essentially, a full factorial design allows for a full exploration of the 
reaction surface, whereas all other experiments are trade-offs between the 
correlation between parameter vectors and computational effort (Kleijnen 2005, 
Sanchez and Lucas 2002). Here, a full factorial design was used because it was 
computationally feasible.
Explanatory variables in the analysis are the HH structure (hhStruct), initial 
cooperativeness (iniCooperativeness) and initial distribution of herd sizes 
(iniHerds). The HH structure encompasses the income, HH size and age of HH 
head. We apply three levels of empirical heterogeneity on the named variables to 
explain the likelihood of cooperation. As defined before, cooperation emerged if 
there was an incidence during the run with 100% norm followers. That is, 
cooperation is a binary variable.
Empirical heterogeneity in agent attributes is defined as one of three abstraction 
levels (variable level abbreviations are in brackets):
• Agents attributes exactly match with individual HH data (full)
• Agent attributes are set to the averages derived from HH data 
(average)
• Agent attributes are random within ranges informed by HH data 
(random)
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The random factor level draws agent attributes from a normal distribution with a 
mean and standard deviation derived from survey data. Normal distributions are 
truncated according to the empirical minimum and maximum values. The average 
factor level uses the same means as used in the random level. All parameter 
values for the average and the random levels can be found in Appendix D (journal 
appendix). 
The reaction surface generated by the full factorial design is used to specify a 
meta-model. Meta-modelling allows increased transparency in communicating 
model behaviour and is used to identify directions of influence (Kleijnen 2005, 
p.265). The latter refers to the sign of coefficients, which indicate the positive or 
negative influences of the explanatory variables on the response. As we are 
interested in the likelihood of cooperation, a probit regression model was used to 
measure cooperation. The analysis focuses on the statistical significance, general 
direction of influence and relative importance of variables. Those attributes are 
measured by the variable’s p-values, signs of coefficients and marginal effects, 
respectively. In the model specification, dummy variables were used for the 
multinomial explanatory variables of HH structure and the initial distribution of 
herd sizes. Random was used as the reference level to assess whether additional
information from the survey has an influence. The average level for initial 
cooperativeness resulted in a perfect prediction error in the probit estimation. That 
is, the same average value of initial cooperativeness for all HH agents results in 
0% cooperation. This is plausible insofar as the structure of the threshold model 
relies on bandwagon effects based on agent heterogeneity, similar to Berger 
(2001). To avoid an omitted variables bias, experiments were conducted again 
without the average level for initial cooperativeness. 
The coefficient table (Table 3.2) shows that all variables except the dummy 
variable of iniHerds_average are significant at a 0.05 level. Thus, there is no 
significant difference in the likelihood of cooperation with respect to a 
parameterisation of the initial herd size between random and average values. 
However, assuming full heterogeneity between herds of HH results in a 
significant and positive effect. The dummy variables assessing assumptions on the 
heterogeneity of HH structure are significantly different from each other.  
However, the average values of the HH structure decreases, and the full empirical 
heterogeneity of the HH attributes increases the probability for cooperation. 
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Finally, a random distribution of values of initial cooperativeness results in a 
higher probability for cooperation compared with a model specified according to 
data of individual HH.
Table 3.2 Probit regression on the likelihood of Cooperation - coefficient table
Variable Coefficient p-value
const -0.502851 .0000
iniHerds_average 0.043175 .4647
iniHerds_full 0.276913 .0000
hhStruct_average -0.230648 .0001
hhStruct_full 0.505937 .0000
iniCooperativeness -0.795022 .0000
F-test 468.2279 .0000
% correct prediction model 76.00
n 3600
In summary, the full utilization of individual HH data has a significant effect for 
all explanatory variables. However, the direction of influence varies along the 
variables. 
Figure 3.7 shows the relative impact of the variables and compares their 
importance for the emergence of cooperation.  Effects are calculated by 
computing the change in the average probability of cooperation if the value of 
one nominal variable is changed to another level (ceteris paribus). That is, the 
average probability of cooperation is computed over the complete reaction 
surface by altering the independent variable of interest.
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Figure 3.7 Effects of different assumptions about empirical heterogeneity in 
agent attributes on the average probability of Cooperation
Full empirical heterogeneity of HH structures and initial herd sizes influence the 
probability of cooperation more than random or average parameter values for 
these variables.
The most important effect is attributed to alterations of a variable directly 
influencing the conditional cooperativeness of individuals. Here, using an average 
value for initial cooperativeness perfectly prevents cooperation. Using normally 
distributed random values for the variable results in a probability of cooperation 
that is 17.1 percent points higher compared to full empirical heterogeneity. In 
contrast, full heterogeneity in the HH structure results in a probability of 
cooperation that is 15.9 percent points higher than runs with average values for 
HH structure variables. The difference between the three levels of heterogeneity is 
lowest with respect to the initial herd size. Using random distributions for all 
explanatory variables smoothes out differences in the effect on cooperation. With 
respect to the chance for cooperation, the outcome on a system level resembles 
the one emerging under full heterogeneity. That is, an artificial population based 
on random distributions is predicted to result in a probability of cooperation in 
38% of the runs.
3.5 Discussion
We conclude that cooperation in the process of norm compliance and sanctioning 
decreases the probability of SES collapse, even in the case of a “resource-blind” 
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norm. Here, an unintended form of resource governance was modelled. The 
results support the findings of Thebaud and Locatelli’s model (2001), which 
found that peer-pressure, or normative sanctioning, is an important aspect in the 
emergence of resource sharing conventions. This is also in line with Tavoni et al., 
who found that “when reputational considerations matter and a sufficient level of 
social stigma affects the violators of a norm, sustainable outcomes are achieved” 
(2012, p. 152) 
Moreover, our results emphasise the importance of ecological rationality in norm-
guided behaviour (Gigerenzer and Selten 2002). That is, norms are reducing 
computation (Epstein 2006). This also holds for the case presented here. That is, it 
is cheap and effective to follow the simple heuristics prescribed by a social norm 
leading to informal self-governance, as it does not involve ecosystem monitoring 
or the additional institutional costs associated with formal rules. In addition, self-
governance itself is distinct from current top-down interventions in South Africa’s 
commons, which have questionable benefits (Vetter 2013). This is in line with 
Schlüter and Pahl-Wostl, who state that “noncompliance and free riding are 
fundamental problems in common-pool resource management,” and they are 
therefore best tackled by self-governance rather than by centralised regimes 
(2007, p.19). 
Furthermore, our results suggest that some social processes in SES can be 
characterized as alternative stable states. The existence of the latter have been 
clearly identified for ecological states by, e.g., Janssen et al. (2004), in some 
biomes of rangeland systems. It remains, however, an open question whether all 
rangeland ecosystems systems exhibit alternative stable states (Vetter 2009). Our 
findings support earlier ones by Wilson et al. insofar that the collective action of a 
“continuing mutual restraint” is needed for conservation (2007, p. 15217) and that 
this continuity constitutes a social alternative stable state in the case presented 
here. The state of cooperation reduces noncompliance, free riding and the risk of 
ecological collapse. 
Cooperation emerges in times of ecological crisis with a small window of 
opportunity. Systemic changes leading to collapse or cooperation are rooted in 
past disturbances. The latter represent opportunities for the social system to adapt 
and to reorganise. During the crisis, social interaction gains momentum and can 
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stabilize in a self-enforcing manner. Or, as McAllister et al. have termed it: “what 
is more exciting is the evidence that variability and uncertainty can induce greater 
trust and reciprocity” (McAllister et al. 2011, p.7) and “trust is critical in that it is 
required to give some degree of confidence that cooperative behaviour will be 
reciprocated” (McAllister et al. 2011, p.2). This also in line with Tavoni et al. 
(2012), who found that ecological variability increases cooperation in their 
common-pool resource model. 
Defection, on the other hand, increases the likelihood of ecosystem collapse. The 
investigation of system collapse in our model underpins Müller et al.’s (2007) 
assertion that inappropriate strategies in semi-arid rangeland systems unveil their 
negative consequences only after decades. Collapse, as the loss of the socio-
ecological link constituted by the utilization of ecosystem services, occurred in 
the model only after decades. Thus, the path-dependence of mismanagement is 
evident in the SES, which stresses the usefulness of SES models per se. 
The results of this analysis contribute to the emergent field of empirical agent-
based modelling (Smajgl and Barreteau 2014; Janssen and Ostrom 2006). Smajgl 
and Barreteau (2014) understand parameterization not as a mere pinning down of 
numbers but rather as a process conveying information about the structure of a 
population needed for a potential up scaling towards an artificial society. A 
sensitivity analysis of the model examined the influence of heterogeneity in agent 
attributes on the emergence of cooperation, which constitutes an abstraction of 
parameterisation to a level above single agent attributes. 
In our model, heterogeneity of agent attributes is a necessity for the emergence of 
cooperation because a uniform parameterization of agents with average values 
prohibits the cascading effects of social interaction. Using random distributions 
instead of individual HH survey data for agent parameterisation has significant 
effects on the probability of cooperation. These effects differ in their statistical 
signature, as some decrease and one increases cooperation. Their combined effect, 
however, is predicted to lead to cooperation with a percentage probability similar 
near to the one realised by parameterization with individual HH. Here, the 
difference was one percent. Thus, caution is advised when observing seemingly 
robust results on the system level for one state variable of interest, as the effect of 
individual variables might change. The latter might impact outcome variables of 
the model (e.g. profits), which were not investigated because such an endeavour 
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was beyond the scope of this paper. Generally, the results from the analysis of 
agent heterogeneity support those of Castillo and Saysel (2005). They found that 
initial values of trust and heterogeneity in agent attributes have path-dependent 
effects in their model of collective action in a common pool resource setting.
Quantitative model validation is still difficult to achieve for any model without 
extensive time series data for matching model outcomes with historic patterns or 
resources to observe future behaviour. Unfortunately, the majority of data for the 
system was lost during the transition from Apartheid to democracy. Future 
research might be needed to follow up the developments of the SES, although it 
remains “a fundamental problem in our investigations [...] how to derive 
observations of a social system over time” as it is extremely difficult to obtain 
funding for repeated visits of communities (Janssen and Ostrom 2006, p. 5). For 
now, the empirical validation of model results is limiting.
However, our primary goal was to contribute to the first steps in integrating 
theoretical models of institutional evolution in empirical agent-based models to 
foster the development of an appropriate methodology rather than to predict 
outcomes for a real world case.
Modelling endogenous institutional processes of systems that couple humans with 
nature is still in its infancy, and there are no established methods for 
implementation. Thus, our approach has to be seen as an experimental one. It 
aims to generate hypotheses about how social interactions are related with 
ecological dynamics. At the same time, this paper attempts to emphasise the 
importance of local specificity embedded in empirical data. Generally, model 
results underpin the necessity of considering the socio-economic, ecological and 
institutional factors involved in the complexity of the rangeland commons if the 
ultimate goal is to arrive at management guidance (Moyo et al. 2008)
A major shortcoming of our model is its inability to model the emergence of 
novelty in constitutional institution building. That is, the normative behaviour 
modelled here builds on what was in place and cannot account for what might 
develop. To anticipate how bounded rational decision makers would create 
novelty in the face of exogenous disturbances is a limitation of the presented 
model here and, at least in our view, constitutes a major research frontier for SES 
modelling. In this field, companion modelling is a promising pathway (Étienne 
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2014). Companion modelling allows for the elucidation of adaptive responses in 
role-play sessions where stakeholders are actively engaged in the modelling 
process (Bousquet et al. 2007; Barreteau et al. 2003).
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Chapter 4
Multi-scale resilience in a 
communal livestock production 
SES13
Abstract: We present results from an agent-based model of a communal livestock 
production system. The underlying case is the village community of Sediba in 
rural Thaba Nchu, South Africa. Villagers use a commonly managed rangeland 
for beef cattle production. The objective is to measure resilience at different 
scales of the socio-ecological system (SES). That is, this paper investigates 
complementary and contradictory dynamics of household, community, ecological 
and socio-ecological resilience. A baseline scenario reveals that the SES remains 
in a stable attractor in terms of socio-ecological resilience. Household resilience, 
however, degrades in a process of structural change. Three scenarios are analyzed 
in order to investigate system reactions to disturbances: (1) A drought scenario 
shows an ecosystem able to recover and returning to baseline patterns but 
structural change at household level accelerated; (2) An increase in the number of 
defecting agents increases the likelihood for SES collapse and systemic change by 
eroding social embededdness within the community; (3) Anti-poverty policies as 
currently discussed in South Africa demonstrate that the SES is able to cope with 
13 This part is the submission to an international multi-disciplinary journal as Rasch, S., Heckelei, 
T., Oomen R. and  Naumann, C.: Multi-scale resilience of a socio-ecological system of communal 
livestock production in South Africa
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an increased number of resource appropriators by an endogenous redistribution of 
assets from wealthier to poorer households. 
Keywords: Socio-ecological system, Resilience, Complex adaptive systems, 
Agent based models, rangeland systems, South Africa
JEL classification: Z13, C63, C62, Q2
4.1 Introduction
Resilience theory is currently replacing the notion of optimality in management 
strategies and the focus on single equilibria ignoring relevant non-linear dynamics 
in certain contexts (Lebel et al. 2006). This is especially evident in the analysis of 
socio-ecological systems (SES). A widespread agreement recently developed with 
respect to the nature of SES as complex systems (Berkes et al. 2003).  In order to 
better understand the complexity of these human-nature coupled systems 
generating resilience on system level, SES modelling emerged as new field which 
contrasts disciplinary approaches treating either the social or the ecological 
dimension as exogenous factors. SES models have been applied to fisheries, 
wildlife and rangeland systems and are borrowing from complex system theory 
and resilience thinking (e.g. Barreteau et al. 2004; Dougill et al. 2010; Little et al. 
2004; Milner-Gulland et al. 2006; Schlüter and Pahl-Wostl 2007; Schlüter et al. 
2012; Winkler 2011). However, the field is still in its infancy when the task is to 
represent complex human decision making (Schlüter et al. 2012, p.248).
A major research task in SES modelling is therefore to understand “[...] the 
macro-scale effects of micro-scale drivers of human behaviour” (Schlüter et al. 
2012, p.240). The interplay between individual decision making and normative 
constraints is an important research topic (Schlüter et al. 2012, p.249), but 
institutional dynamics are rarely endogenously modelled (McAllister et al. 2006, 
Smajgl et al. 2010, p.98). Schlüter et al. also remind us that models attempting to 
represent these aspects of human behaviour should be structurally realistic going 
beyond generic mathematical models (2013, pp.7-9). Structural realism can be 
achieved with bottom-up modelling approaches being able to consider bounded 
rationality. 
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Individual decision making and normative behaviour at group level strongly 
depend on the context of the SES (McAllister et al. 2011). However, existing SES 
models are often hypothetical and lack the empirical ground to deliver future 
trajectories of system paths for “real-world problems” (Schlüter et al. 2012, 
p.256). Baumgärtner et al. stress that the theoretical perspective underlying our 
models must be unified with, and based on the empirical reality of case studies
(2008). Here, empirical agent based models are well suited to integrate case study 
data (Janssen and Ostrom 2006).
SES models with a resilience focus face the additional difficulty to arrive at 
quantifiable measures for this concept. Although conceptual models of coupled 
human-ecological systems are refined constantly within the domain of resilience 
theory, they fail to deliver quantifiable measures for real world cases (Walker et 
al. 2002). To measure resilience in field studies is very problematic, as it requires 
observing large time scales or external intervention as “the only sure way to 
detect a threshold in a complex system is to cross it” and research has “little 
experience with estimating resilience of SES” (Carpenter et al. 2005, p.941).  In 
principle, SES models offer a pathway to explore the configuration space of SES 
by elucidating system inherent thresholds in silicio. However, measures of 
resilience in models incorporating more complex decision making are taken on a 
single scale and are snapshots in time (e.g. in Schlüter and Pahl-Wostl 2007; 
Schlüter et al. 2009; Carpenter et al. 2004). The acknowledgement of the complex 
nature of SES stipulates to take multiple scales of resilience into account (Miller 
et al. 2010).
In this paper we make an attempt to tackle the described issues in SES resilience 
modelling by presenting a communal livestock production SES model which 
offers quantifiable measures of multi-scale resilience under the consideration of 
heterogeneous decision making and institutional dynamics. The model design was 
based on empirical data from the case study in order to account for the socio-
ecological context and constitutes an alteration of the model in Rasch et al. 
(2014). The purpose of the model is to answer three research questions relevant 
for the underlying case: What are the effects of 
1. a drought shock, 
2. a fundamental change in livestock ownership and,
4.2 Theoretical framework for measuring multi-scale resilience 97
3. of the introduction of a basic income grant
on the resilience at multiple scales of the system? In the next section, we outline 
the theoretical framework for measuring multi-scale resilience followed by a 
summary of case study results in the third section. The fourth section provides an 
outline of the model structure and results follow in the fifth. Section six presents a 
discussion on results and SES modelling for resilience research.
4.2 Theoretical framework for measuring multi-scale 
resilience
Resilience is an important measure in terms of the health of the SES (Hawes and 
Reed 2006, p.644). However, a multitude of resilience definitions exists in the 
literature. These range from highly abstract concepts on system level to social- or 
ecosystem specific indicators (e.g. Seixas and Berkes 2003; Hawes and Reed 
2006, p.644; Holling 2001, p.400; Schlüter and Pahl-Wostl 2007, p.4). The 
growth of theoretical approaches to explain the resilience increases fuzziness 
(Pendall et al. 2010, p.72) and contradictions while not delivering a common 
framework to make it measurable. This shortcoming may originate from the fact 
that "important aspects of resilience might not be directly observable" (Carpenter 
et al. 2005, p.941). Carpenter et al. thus advice us to infer resilience indirectly 
which led them to use the term ‘surrogates’ instead of indicators for resilience
(2005). 
According to Miller et al., resilience measures should capture dynamic processes 
instead of being static indicators (2010). They are also in line with Carpenter et al. 
who stress that resilience indicators should “address multiple aspects of 
resilience” (2005, p.942) as resilience is "constructed simultaneously on more 
than one scale" (Miller et al. 2010).
In addition of being multi-scale, dynamic and measurable by means of surrogates, 
SES resilience is stated to be an emergent phenomenon:
“Resilience may be considered an emergent property of a system, one that cannot be 
predicted or understood by simply examining the system’s parts.” (Berkes et al. 2003, p.5)
As we are concerned with resilience in SES, scales of emergence are naturally 
resembled by the ecological and social dimension generating ecological and 
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social resilience from which SES resilience emerges (Figure 4.1). Moreover, the 
ecological and social dimension might be further detangled such that sub-
dimensional scales of resilience are evident.
Figure 4.1 Emerging SES resilience scales
If we adopt Walker et al.’s definition of SES resilience as the
“[...] capacity of a system to experience shocks while retaining essentially the same 
function, structure, feedbacks, and therefore its identity” (2006),
we must understand system identity on SES level as exactly that: the identity of 
emergent phenomena and stylized facts of the coupled system measured by means 
of dynamic resilience surrogates emerging over different SES scales. The change 
in resilience can then be "visualized in different scenarios in an agent-based 
model" (Miller et al. 2010). 
Following this line of argumentation, we present a synthesis of resilience 
surrogates on different SES scales. We exemplify this by applying those to a 
community based livestock production system in South Africa appropriating from 
a common rangeland. Here, we differentiate between ecological, household, 
social and SES resilience and seek to choose simple surrogates with the potential 
to be observable in field studies.
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4.2.1 Ecosystem resilience
Some authors understand ecological resilience as the capacity of ecosystems to 
absorb disturbances without undergoing fundamental change (Drever et al. 2006). 
Others understand it as the rate of recovery from a disturbance (Adger 2000). An 
explanation for these seemingly controversial concepts might be found in the 
diversity of ecosystems themselves. The classical example of eutrophication of 
lakes is a good fit for the first definition of ecosystem resilience as aquatic 
systems can shift between clearly distinguishable states (Scheffer et al. 2001). The 
same, but in a less pronounced way, accounts for semi-arid rangelands which 
might shift from a grass dominated towards a shrub-dominated state (Sankaran et 
al. 2005). However, for highly resilient ecosystems like "sweet-" and "sour velds" 
in southern Africa we might go beyond the binary assessment of resilience 
(Harrison and Shackleton 1999, p.226) and assess the degree of resilience by 
measuring the time of recovery in such ecosystems characterized by reversible 
transitions. 
Walker et al. suggested using the ecosystem state responsible for producing 
ecosystem services as a measure of ecological resilience in SES (2002). 
Ecosystem state is represented by variables associated with potential thresholds 
causing changes in dynamic patterns; being temporal or irreversible.  Examples 
are the amount of P in lake sediments or woody vegetation biomass in rangelands. 
For our application, we propose to quantify ecosystem resilience by means of two 
variables serving as surrogates for (reversible) grassland degradation in highly 
resilient South African "sweetvelds" (Harrison and Shackleton 1999): grazing 
pressure and basal cover. 
Grazing pressure on rangelands is a main driver for the functioning of grasslands 
and can cause degradation if it is above the system-specific grazing capacity for a 
sustained time span (Harrison and Shackleton 1999, p.233; Ebrahimi et al. 2010). 
Consequently, grazing pressure may serve as an indicator for upcoming 
degradation. We propose to complement this surrogate with the basal cover to 
identify if resource degradation is the cause of a decline in grazing pressure. Basal 
cover is the area covered by plants at ground level and is directly related to the 
amount of photosynthetic biomass responsible for future growth and recovery. 
Basal cover is commonly used as an indicator for rangeland qualities of semi-arid 
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grassland ecosystems of South Africa (Wiegand et al. 2004, p.245; Snyman 
2005). Those qualities resemble different grazing histories in terms of grazing 
pressure. Snyman found 8.3%, 6.4% and 2.9% basal cover for good, moderate 
and poor rangeland respectively (2005). Basal cover as a dynamic surrogate can 
be used to measure the change of rangeland condition and degradation over time.  
4.2.2 Household resilience
In the social realm, individuals form the social construct of a household (HH). An 
example for the attempt to assess resilience on HH level can be found in the 
discourse on vulnerability which is closely related to resilience thinking. Berzborn 
et al. define resilience from the vulnerability perspective as:
“[...] the ability to cope with hazards and includes strategies to reduce the vulnerability of 
households and individuals.” (2007, p.673)
Similar lines of reasoning can also be found in Kelly and Adger (2000) and Smit 
and Wandel (2006). According to Adger, the integration of vulnerability with 
resilience research offers a great potential for arriving at quantifiable 
measurements of SES dynamics (2006). In the context of communal livestock 
production systems, livestock husbandry constitutes a HH strategy which 
increases income diversity, buffer capacity and adaptability to unfavourable 
circumstances as it can be quickly liquidized (Giannecchini et al. 2007, p.37). In 
addition, livestock serves non-monetary purposes in the cultural context of 
communities (Shackleton et al. 2001). 
We propose to measure the degree of HH resilience stemming from livestock 
husbandry on two levels of increasing rigor. These are (1) realization of access to 
the resource and (2) asset poverty. The realization of resource access is measured 
as the total number of HH owning livestock within a community and represents 
the potential to build HH resilience. Asset poverty measures the number of HH 
whose assets are not sufficient to sustain an income above the national poverty 
line for a defined time span by liquidizing their wealth. That is, HH are asset poor 
if the value of assets (livestock) is lower than a certain fraction of the annual 
national poverty line. The latter determines the time span in months in which 
poverty is avoided by selling assets (Brandolini et al. 2010, p.11).  HH resilience 
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must then be analysed in the light of resource degradation as HH resilience 
involves sustaining the resource base.
4.2.3 Social resilience on the community scale
Following Giannecchini et al., we differentiate resilience on the HH level from 
social resilience on the community level (2007, p.39). For Adger, social resilience 
is equivalent to the resilience of institutions and the degree of trust in 
communities (2000, p.351). We propose to investigate the emergent phenomena 
on the social level which are hypothesized to impact institutions and trust, i.e. a 
surrogate for social resilience.
According to Ostrom, institutional arrangements are derived in a so-called ‘action 
arena’ representing the social space of interaction (2005, p.13). Action arenas are 
by themselves influenced by the attributes of the community determining the 
costs for implementation and maintenance of rules. One such attribute is the 
“extent of inequality of basic assets [...]” (Ostrom 2005, p.27) which is an 
emergent property of HH interaction as they compete in terms of resource 
appropriation and regulate each other during social interactions.  Costs are 
associated with the enforcement of rules if those have not been normatively 
internalized. Normative sanctioning is cheaper. 
Bounded rational decision makers are highly inequality averse (Tyran and 
Sausgruber 2006). They punish those raising inequality (Fehr and Gachter 2002, 
p.139). Thus, persistent high inequality indicates a loss in the receptiveness of 
participants towards social pressure arising from normative sanctioning which 
makes formal sanctioning necessary to enforce rules. The latter might be too 
costly for implementation such that institutions collapse or do not emerge. As a 
surrogate for social resilience, we apply the Gini coefficient to the herd sizes of 
HH in our communal livestock production system as a measure for inequality.
4.2.4 Socio-ecological resilience
Referring to our example SES, the interaction between the social and the 
ecological dimension of rangelands “can introduce thresholds in addition to those 
introduced by ecological processes alone” (Gross et al. 2006, p.1265). We 
furthermore assume that this accounts for social processes as well. Irrespective of 
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the specific SES, a variable being able to assess the resilience of a coupled system 
should be focused on the intertwined dynamics of emergent phenomena on the 
social and ecological scale. Walker et al. propose the mapping of ecological with 
social variables to tackle the operationalization of SES resilience (2002). 
They focus on the dynamic patterns of such a combined measure. In their 
example of a rangeland SES, the authors use debt-income ratio and woody 
vegetation as social and ecological variables, respectively. The system can be 
characterized by the type of its dynamic patterns which is a function of the size of 
the basin of attraction as well as of the position of the basin in the configuration 
space. In their example (Figure 4.2), a system configuration characterized by low 
debt-income ratio and low degree of woody vegetation (i) is pushed into one 
exhibiting high values for both variables (ii). The disturbance can either stem 
from the ecological or social realm. 
Figure 4.2 SES resilience measured as dynamic patterns of social and ecological 
surrogates
Source: adapted from Walker et al. (2002)
An increase of the size of the basin of attraction (iii) might prevent such shifts and 
means an increase in the resilience of the first (i) configuration. According to 
system theory, the first pattern (i) can be characterized as a limit cycle whereas 
the second (ii) represents a lock-in pattern. The increase of the basin of attraction 
(iii) prevents the transition from limit cycling to lock-in. The sustained identity of 
the dynamic pattern in the face of external disturbances constitutes SES 
resilience. Janssen et al. applied this approach for mapping dynamic resilience 
surrogates to ecological scales in their rangeland model (2001). However, we are 
not aware of any application of the concept to socio-ecological scales.  
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We use the ecological and social resilience surrogates of grazing pressure and 
inequality of herd sizes to map the dynamic patterns constituting SES resilience in 
order to identify systemic change due to external disturbances.
4.3 Case study
The following section delineates the SES case, presents field data collection 
methods and outlines the main findings. A condensed case study description can 
be found in Rasch et al. (2014).
4.3.1 Delineation
The empirical case informing our SES model is constituted by the village 
community of Sediba. Sediba is one out of 37 communities spread over the rural 
area of Thaba Nchu in South Africa. During Apartheid, the Thaba Nchu district 
was a target area for massive betterment and resettlement program. In 1972, the 
district became part of the Bophuthatswana Homeland, which was declared 
“independent” in 1977. The agricultural policy of Bophuthatswana aimed at the 
increase of the agricultural production to achieve self-sufficiency in food 
production and the improvement of the livelihoods of the people living in the 
rural areas. A parastatal organization called Agricultural Development 
Corporation of Bophuthatswana (Agricor) was established in 1978 in order to 
plan agricultural projects and rendering assistance to local farmers (Erasmus and 
Krige 1998; Drummond 1990). Agricor implemented projects in which 
participants hired the organization to conduct all the agricultural operations. At 
the seasons end the organization paid them after deducting the costs for the 
services. This procedure created a high dependency of the rural farmers from 
governmental aid. Agricor’s support discontinued in the early 1990s (Murray 
1996).  Agricultural subsidization ended but the inflow of capital remained after 
the fall of Apartheid. That is, post-apartheid government substantially increased 
large-scale social assistance payment schemes which changed the determinants of 
livestock ownership structure and management.
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4.3.2 Data
A living standard and measurement survey (Worldbank) was administered to 230 
livestock producing HH in several villages of the rural Thaba Nchu region. The 
questionnaire entailed modules on HH structure, livestock production and 
management, income, assets, expenditures, credit, savings and institutional issues. 
Additionally, a survey encompassing 120 HH who are not engaged in livestock 
production contributed to the data base on social determinants of the SES. 
Moreover, nine months of anthropological field research assessed cultural aspects 
and ecosystem perception. The assessment of rangeland condition and productive 
capacity was conducted by rangeland and soil scientists by sampling vegetation 
(cover, biomass, species composition) and soil (composition, bulk density) along 
a degradation transect, and at random plots throughout the community’s 
rangelands. Links to survey templates and data files can be found in the appendix 
(A).
4.3.3 The Sediba SES
Among the respondents of the HH survey was the full population (80) of livestock 
producers out of the total population of 160 HH residing in Sediba. A 2500 ha 
rangeland constitutes the natural resource base for the village community. The 
region is categorized as a semi-arid grassland biome (Rutherford and Westfall 
1994). The mean precipitation is 537 mm per annum (Swemmer et al. 2007; 
Woyessa et al. 2006). Forage is the main ecosystem service of the rangeland. 
Dominant species of the “Moist Cool Highveld Grassland Type” (Bredenkamp 
and van Rooyen 1996) are perennial C4 bunchgrasses (Themeda triandra, 
Eragrostis lehmanniana and Digitaria eriantha). The South African term “sweet 
veld” refers to the good palatability of the dominant species on those rangelands 
(Palmer and Ainslie 2005).  Cattle are the predominant grazer. Villagers have 
common access to the rangeland such that the regime is characterized as a 
common-pool resource (CPR) (Ostrom 2005, p.24). Ownership in Sediba is 
fluctuating due to entries and exits of HH into and from livestock production. 
Herds belonging to HH are small with 25 cattle in the largest herd. Livestock is 
not viewed to be a main income source (Berzborn 2007, p.679). Instead, livestock 
ownership reduces HH vulnerability, is seen as a saving account or is slaughtered 
during funerals and other cultural events. Livestock production is a phenomenon 
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of a middle class as the probability to own livestock is lower for poor and richer 
HH compared to those with a moderate income. Villagers either sell cattle 
according to simple rules of thumb or because of liquidity constraints. The latter 
does not occur if HH have income and monetary savings giving them a “superior 
coping capacity” (Barrett et al. 2001, p.326). Cash income also increases the 
probability to sustain herds in times of drought allowing to buy agricultural inputs 
(Berzborn 2007, p.683). From the standpoint of the poor we might say: “the poor 
are poor not only because they have few assets, but also because they are 
constrained in their ability to utilize effectively the assets they do have” (Carter 
and May 1999, p.15). Carter and May specifically mention transfer income in this 
context. In Sediba, off-farm income itself is dominated by state transfers. Figure 
4.3 shows the sources of HH income along the income quintiles.
Figure 4.3 Income quintiles with sources for livestock producing HH in Sediba
Figure 4.3 emphasizes the importance of state grants per se (old age, child, and 
disability grant) as well as the effect of the demographic structure of HH. That is, 
the most important state grants are coupled to age: child grant (<18 years) and old 
age grant (>60 years). Low-income HH receive a larger share of income from 
child grant (270 Rand per child) whereas old age grant (1140-1160 Rand per 
eligible person) constitutes the main income source for richer HH. 
Next to off-farm-income-driven selling practices, HH pursue a minimal input 
strategy. New livestock is only bought for entering livestock production and 
inputs as supplementary fodder or veterinary items are only supplied with low 
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intensity. Input intensity is low because of risk aversion towards potential losses 
of investments and is additionally constrained by HH income. 
During interviews with stakeholders, it became evident that no formal rules of 
resource governance have emerged after the dismantling of Agricor as a top-down 
service provider. However, many respondents stated that a significant increase in 
their herd size would result in a form of normative sanctioning. That is, others 
would “become envious and make problems”. The simple norm is not driven by 
ecosystem constraints rather than by inequality aversion which is one of the main 
drivers of social interaction within the SES.  However, several HH were identified 
who did not produce their own livestock but livestock owned by non-residents. 
Consequently, those HH manage such herds in accordance with the instructions of 
owners who are located outside the border of the SES.
To summarize, formal institutions collapsed in the post-apartheid era as they were 
externally imposed and no formal institutions of resource use emerged thereafter. 
The probability to be in or to enter into livestock production is greatest for middle 
income HH. Selling practices, input strategies and entries into livestock 
production are driven by HH liquidity with age coupled state grants as their main 
income source. Inequality of herd sizes is sanctioned in a normative manner. The 
prohibitive norm prescribes not to raise inequality in terms of herd size. However, 
the norm is only applicable to those HH who manage their own herds. The next 
section outlines the principle model structure which was designed in order to 
reflect the structurally relevant elements described above. 
4.4 Model description
The SES model is constituted by the integration of a social agent based model 
(ABM) and an ecological rangeland model. The model is an adapted version of 
Rasch et al. (2014). The following section introduces an overview of the model 
but restricts sub-model descriptions to changes to the references model. A full 
ODD+D protocol, including details on sub-models, can be found in the online 
appendix (http://www.ilr.uni-bonn.de/agpo/publ/techpap/Techpap15-01.pdf).
The motivation for changes to the model structure is the construction of HH and 
social resilience measures which commanded a more fine grained resolution with 
respect to agent heterogeneity. All changes are based on empirical findings from 
4.4 Model description 107
case study data. Allowing for empirically motivated agent heterogeneity follows 
findings from earlier model analysis which underpins the importance of 
heterogeneity in agent attributes for model outcomes (Rasch et al. 2014). 
Changes or additions to the reference model were made with respect to (1) 
fertility management, (2) livestock reproduction, (3) timing of the selling 
decision, (4) HH heterogeneity regarding expenditures and selling behaviour, (5) 
learning of selling rules and (6) cooperation in the context of a social norm.
4.4.1 Overview
A condensed overview of the functional relationships between model elements is 
given in figure 4.4. 
Figure 4.4 Model flow - overview
Starting with the exogenous impact of weather on resource biomass production, 
the rangeland model calculates the available total standing biomass (TSC), green 
standing biomass (GSC) and green growth of the last month while taking past 
forage consumption into account. The three biomass variables result in a monthly 
value for live-weight gain from ecosystem service provision. Annual live-weight 
gain is additionally increased by supplementary feeding and determines adult 
mortality and maximum net-reproduction. Reproduction is additionally influenced 
by fertility management. HH exit livestock production in case cattle mortality 
resulted in an extinction of the reproductive capital of herds. Depending on the 
respective HH selling practice, agents sell livestock relying on animal 
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characteristics or the size of the herd. Livestock can also be sold as a result of rule 
obedience in terms of social interaction as a self-enforcing process. Here, mutual 
cooperation or defection is an emergent phenomenon produced by agents who are 
heterogeneous in terms of cooperativeness and reciprocity. The type of HH, 
determining selling practices, is a function of total income and savings per HH 
member. After initialization, the HH type also determines expenditures which are 
deducted from total income to calculate savings. Total income is the sum of profit 
from livestock sales and off-farm income. The latter is exogenously defined by 
four social grants, wages, HH businesses, and remittances. Social grants depend 
on the HH structure and social policy measures targeted at certain attributes of 
HH members. The probability of new entries depends on off-farm income and HH 
attributes. The total herd size plus additional cattle of entry-HH accumulate to the 
total stocking rate which results in an aggregate consumption of resource biomass 
during each month. 
The following sub-sections describes additions and changes to the reference 
model in Rasch et al. (2014).
4.4.2 Fertility management
HH data from the Sediba survey showed that calving intervals are heterogeneous 
between herds. They were estimated by the respondents to be 12, 18 or 24 months 
long. We implemented calving intervals specific for females of distinctive herds 
by means of an ordered probit model. We hypothesize that experience, practices 
increasing animal health and breeding strategies increase the probability for a 
shorter calving interval. 
4.4.3 Net-reproduction
The model allows for births in every month in order to account for the findings of 
heterogeneous calving intervals. In the reference model, net reproduction was 
based on the assumption of yearly calving intervals directly derived from the 
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branding rate14 as in Gross et al. (2006). However, cows in Sediba can have 
considerable longer calving intervals compared to commercial settings. Longer 
calving intervals lead to a lower net reproduction. In the current model, the 
branding rate represents an upper constraint on net reproduction. Maximum net 
reproduction is modelled as explicit births. Calves don’t survive the first year if 
births exceed an upper bound of net-reproduction as determined by the branding 
rate for that year. This approach allows accounting for lower reproduction due to 
unsound management and for an upper limit on reproduction only restricted by 
forage availability expressed by the branding rate15. 
4.4.4 Timing of selling
Survey data revealed that HH differ with respect to the timing of livestock sales 
during the year. Data analysis showed that HH who use less supplementary feed 
are more likely to sell during winter. This is a time of forage shortage on the 
rangelands with an increasing risk of livestock losses. HH who provide more 
supplementary feeding are able to sustain their herds during winter and can sell 
livestock during the growing season which results in higher live-weight and thus 
in higher selling prices. 
4.4.5 HH typology regarding expenditures and selling behaviour
HH differ in their expenditure pattern, income and resulting liquidity. This 
heterogeneity results in differences in the need to sell livestock in order to balance 
expenditures with agricultural income. The HH typology differentiates between 
HH above and below the upper poverty line. A cluster analysis of HH below the 
poverty line revealed three homogenous sub-groups differing with respect to 
income, savings and livestock selling rates (% herd sold). The model accounts for 
this type of agent heterogeneity by allowing for differences in selling behaviour 
14 Branding rate is the percentage of calves which survived the first year. Gross et al.'s calculation 
assumes that all cows calve in each year.
15 banding rate is a linear function of yearly live-weight gain
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and expenditure patterns among four HH types. HH types can dynamically 
change depending on changes in income and savings.
4.4.6 Learning of selling rules
The current model integrates a more fine-grained learning process with respect to 
environmental conditions by utilizing the genetic algorithm in the selling decision 
in the framework of a learning classifier system (Hufschlag 2010). A learning 
classifier system classifies the environment of the decision maker. Each potential 
action of the agent is coupled with an external condition. The model accounts for 
two different conditions; drought periods and times of forage abundance. The 
agent observes the environment indirectly by monitoring the live-weight gain of 
the herd. A bad period triggers one of the two sets of solution candidates with 
respect to selling rules. Thus, the adaptive learning of agents is directly coupled to 
environmental states which induce a parallel evolution of solution chromosomes.
4.4.7 Norm
Agents are conditional co-operators wavering between cooperation and defection 
with respect to a social norm (Ostrom 2003; Ebenhöh and Pahl-Wostl 2008). The 
norm “not to have much more cattle than others” is enforced by normative 
sanctioning. The likelihood of conditional co-operators engaging in mutual 
cooperation increases with rising inequality and the share of co-operators. 
Contrary, the probability for cooperation decreases with the severity of norm 
violations. Cooperation leads to additional sales of livestock in case HH have 
larger herds. Agents are heterogeneous in their initial value for conditional 
cooperation based on four agent attributes. Please find a detailed description of 
the theoretical framework, modelled processes and implementation details in 
Rasch et al. (2014) or in the ODD+D protocol (http://www.ilr.uni-
bonn.de/agpo/publ/techpap/Techpap15-01.pdf).
The model was adapted to allow agents to be permanent defectors. Defectors will 
never adhere to the norm. Thus, the model introduces additional heterogeneity by 
differentiating between those agents being conditional co-operators and those who 
always defect. 
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4.5 Scenarios and results
Next, we present three different disturbance scenarios and corresponding results, 
which are compared to a baseline scenario in terms of the earlier defined 
resilience surrogates.
4.5.1 Scenarios
In order to assess the system reaction towards social and ecological impacts, we 
ran three different scenarios and compared resulting resilience surrogates with 
those from a baseline scenario. All runs span 100 years and we present results 
following an initial warm-up phase (120 months). Underlying assumptions are 
that the demographic structure in terms of HH composition and size of the 
population persists and that the relation of income and prices is stable over time. 
The baseline scenario uses randomized weather data collected over 12 years in the 
region and assumes that all agents are conditional co-operators. We compare the 
baseline system configuration measured at ecological, HH and SES resilience 
with a system (1) shocked by droughts, (2) loss of social embededdness and with 
(3) a system where severe poverty is reduced due to anti-poverty policies. In order 
to account for stochasticity, we conducted repeated experiments (n=300) for each 
scenario.
(1) The drought scenario assumes a twelve year period with ~50% of average 
rain from year 40 on. 
(2) A second scenario mimicking the loss of social embededdness (e.g. due to 
an increasing share of HH producing livestock for non-residents) assumes 
a share of 50% defectors in the population. 
(3) A third experiment reduces poverty by means of policy measures. A 
Basic Income Grant (BIG) is implemented which is a widely discussed 
policy instrument in South Africa (Barchiesi 2007; Standing and Samson 
2003; Standing 2008)(http://binews.org/2012/07/south-africa-protesters-
demand-basic-income-grant/). The aim of BIG is to decrease severe 
poverty by reaching the unemployed labour force currently not receiving 
any (age-coupled) social grants. BIG guarantees a low and unconditional 
grant for all citizens of South Africa. No person should be worse off after 
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the implementation. We implement BIG as an unconditional grant of 200 
Rand per month and person. We additionally increase the child grant by 
50% in order reach the poorest HH (Triegaardt 2005). To reflect current 
discussion on consequences for the state budget, the old age grant (1140-
1160 Rand) is reduced by the BIG amount. 
As we are interested in general long-term patterns of the system, we use the data 
points of every 10th year with an indication of the temporal direction. Ten-yearly 
measurements are taken for one month (September) during the dry season when 
winter forage shortage limits live-weight gain and the probability for degradation 
is highest.    
4.5.2 Baseline
The pattern of SES resilience measured at the gini coefficient of herd sizes and 
grazing pressure as ha per large stock unit (400kg) (Figure 4.5) for the time span 
of analysis indicates that the system configuration exhibits the dynamic pattern of 
a limit cycle. That is, the SES resides in the basin of a system inherent attractor 
and is not crossing the border of the basin. 
Figure 4.5 SES resilience – baseline scenario
Note: Grey dots represent data points for all months simulated (without warm up phase). We omit 
the presentation of all data points in the forthcoming graphs for the sake of visual clarity. 
The percentage of basal cover is oscillating around the value measured for a 
moderate veld (6.4%) (Figure 4.6). 
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Figure 4.6 Basal cover – baseline scenario
Underlying processes explaining this pattern are twofold. First, higher stocking 
density increases appropriation and decreases the productive capacity of the 
resource leading to lower livestock reproduction and more cattle losses which in 
turn reduce herd sizes as well as inequality among those. Second, high inequality 
increases the vividness of the situation (perceived inequality) and inequality 
averse agents increase normative sanctioning. Norm obedience then results in 
additional sales reducing herd sizes of larger herds. The latter decreases both: 
inequality and grazing pressure.  
These patterns constitute a stable system configuration. Thus, the baseline SES 
does not exhibit the system characteristics, which would result in a "tragedy of the 
commons" as predicted by classical economic theory (Hardin 1968). The social 
system (including livestock) buffers resource limitations by adaption of herd 
sizes, constituting a central resilience mechanism of the SES.
However, time series data on HH resilience surrogates user access and asset 
poverty reveal dynamic patterns on another resilience scale. Figure 4.7(i) shows 
that user access in terms of HH being able to sustain production shows a 
downward trend. Moreover, the share of asset poor HH is increasing over the 
analyzed period (Figure 4.7(ii)).
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Figure 4.7 User access and asset poverty – baseline scenario
There is a discrepancy between SES and HH resilience as the stability of the SES 
is accompanied by a decreasing user base over time. Poor HH are slowly exiting 
production and richer HH fill the gap by increasing herd sizes within the 
boundaries allowed by the norm. However, they do so collectively such that 
inequality (within the group of livestock owners) is not affected and grazing 
pressure remains stable.
4.5.3 Drought
Figure 4.8 shows the dynamic pattern of SES resilience for the system subject to 
the drought scenario. 
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Figure 4.8 SES resilience – drought vs. baseline scenario
The drought shock pushed the system towards the boundary of the basin of 
attraction but it returned to the limit cycle pattern thereafter with a temporal 
delay. The SES was resilient towards the shock but needed several decades to 
recover.
Due to the dry years, resource biomass production is limited and further reduced 
by animal intake.  This short time degradation effect is also reflected in a 
downward shift in basal cover following the drought disturbance (Figure 4.9).
Figure 4.9 Basal cover – drought vs. baseline scenario
The grassland ecosystem was able to recover due to the fact that HH in Sediba 
usually don't restock their herds. Livestock and thus the social system buffered the 
shock originating in the ecological system and the coupled system recovered 
afterwards. This is in line with Campbell et al., who state that “under typical 
semi-arid conditions, severe degradation may be partially forestalled because 
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cattle die off during dry stressful years, thus allowing the vegetation to recover 
during subsequent years” (2000, p.429). 
HH resilience surrogates also return to the baseline pattern after the eco-system 
shock. The pattern of user access over time has the same statistical signature in 
terms of seasonal and long-term trends as in the baseline scenario but its 
magnitude slightly shifted (Figure 4.10(i)). The number of HH realizing resource 
access is less and the difference to the baseline level persists. The phenomenon, 
although with positive long-term trend, shows in asset poverty as well (Figure 
4.10(ii)). 
Figure 4.10 User access and asset poverty – drought vs. baseline scenario
A multi-annual drought period does not overstrain SES resilience but accelerates 
the process of structural change in Sediba and reduces HH resilience. 
4.5.4 Erosion of social embededdness
A second scenario assumes a high share of defectors in the systems. Defecting 
agents are not socially embedded with respect to the normative process and will 
thus not obey the norm nor will they participate by sanctioning norm violators. 
The scenario assumes a share of 50% defectors which results in a collapse of the 
SES in 20% of the simulation runs. Here, we define SES collapse as a major 
breakdown of livestock production due to resource depletion.  Specifically as a 
moment in time in which the ecosystem service of forage production declines 
such that utilization by livestock is zero and herds cannot survive. 
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Figure 4.11 SES resilience – collapse at 50% defectors (example run)
Figure 4.11 shows the simultaneous increase of inequality and grazing pressure
over time and exemplifies such a breakdown where long-term overgrazing 
resulted in grassland-degradation characterized by a low productivity. The total 
stocking density in later years is above the (dynamic) grazing capacity of the 
rangeland rendering it sensitive to years with unfavorable weather and eventually 
leads to a collapse. The effect of resource degradation over time also shows in the 
trend of basal cover pushed down well below a level indicating a bad veld (2.9%) 
(Figure 4.12).
Figure 4.12 Basal cover – collapse at 50% defectors (example run)
The reversed trend of basal cover in the last phase indicates hysteresis. Here, 
grazing pressure pushed the ecosystem over an ecological threshold. Cattle losses 
over the last decade of the run were not sufficient for the ecosystem to return to a 
state of productivity to be sustainable for the remaining herds.  This is not an 
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irreversible flip into another domain of attraction but it highlights the mechanism 
of hysteresis: a reduction of resource appropriation to a level that was sustainable 
in the baseline did not suffice for recovery (Janssen et al. 2004, p.141; Bodin and 
Norberg 2005, p.178). 
Rising inequality constitutes a symptom indicating the loss of SES resilience 
(Figure 4.11). The high share of defectors inhibited collective action in two ways:  
by (1) decreasing the cooperativeness of conditional cooperators due to increased 
severity of norm violations and by (2) decreasing reciprocity due to a loss in the 
trust that others will be reciprocators.  The combined effect on conditional 
cooperativeness was stronger than high inequality lowering the threshold for 
normative sanctioning. Or termed differently, the “just anger” of participants was 
replaced by “hopelessness” in the light of collective action being a dead loss.  
Figures 4.13 reveal the dramatic and sudden loss of HH resilience in terms of the 
user access (i) and asset poverty (ii) following ecological collapse. 
Figure 4.13 User access and asset poverty – collapse at 50% defectors (example 
run)
It is, however, notable that the dynamic patterns prior to collapse are close to 
those for the baseline scenario (Figure 4.13). This fact underpins that the SES 
configuration crossed a socio-ecological tipping point which induced sudden 
change. Such a process of resource degradation due to overgrazing with a socially 
sub-optimal outcome appears to resemble the classic tragedy of the commons. 
This result mirrors Boding and Norberg’s findings of an “inevitability of the 
tragedy of the commons if no mechanisms are present to provide capacity for 
mutual agreements” (2005, p.185). Institutional failure, as a result of the loss of 
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social embededdness, eroded the constraints for individual action which led to a 
loss of SES resilience and collapse. Our results confirm earlier findings that 
“brittle” social structures can lead to collapse and systemic change (Kobti et al. 
2003, p.1988).
4.5.5 Anti-poverty policy
A last simulation scenario introduces policy measures aiming at the reduction of 
severe poverty; namely, a basic income grant to all participants (200 Rand) and an 
increase in the payment for child support (+50%). Old age grant is adjusted such 
it remains on the initial level (1140-1160 Rand). 
SES resilience patterns exhibit two notable facts: (1) the cyclic pattern shifts to 
the right indicating a slightly increased grazing pressure (2) but the dynamic 
pattern remains within the boundary of the initial basin of attraction and patterns 
match (Figure 4.14).  No sudden change occurs.
Figure 4.14 SES resilience - anti-poverty policy
The ecosystem is sufficiently resilient to cope with the increased grazing pressure 
generated by the social system as indicated by the trends of basal cover in figure 
4.15. No change in patterns in terms of trend reversion takes place. Increased 
degradation is only marginal and does not indicate a systemic change.
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Figure 4.15 Basal cover - anti-poverty policy
However, we observe a systemic change on the level of HH resilience (Figures 
4.16). The patterns for both surrogates change insofar as they constitute 
oscillating but stable dynamics over the time span of analysis. Asset poverty (ii) 
and resource access (i) converge towards a stable attractor. 
Figure 4.16 User access and asset poverty - anti-poverty policy
Figure 4.17 depicts individual HH resilience comparing the scenario to the 
baseline. Data points represent the net wealth of HH in terms of the monetary 
value of livestock at the end of simulation runs. The x-axis denotes wealth for the 
baseline and y-axis for the anti-poverty policy scenario. Data points on the 90° 
line represent HH which have not been affected by the alternative scenario 
compared to the baseline. Those HH below that line exhibit a lower level of 
wealth and those above the line a higher level of wealth due to the intervention. 
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Figure 4.17 Net worth in cattle of individual HH at the end of simulation -
baseline vs. anti-poverty policy scenario
Note: we are not measuring the direct effect of increased income on HH resilience.  The HH 
resilience surrogates emerge due to agent interaction and are influenced by the level of off-farm 
income.
Figure 4.17 shows that those HH who were better off in the baseline scenario 
exhibit lower values for accumulated wealth whereas the majority of HH with 
very small or no herds could gain in wealth due to increased off-farm income.
To summarize, the implementation of BIG and child grant increase drastically 
reduce the negative effects of structural change on HH resilience by increasing the 
chances for poor HH to successfully compete with richer HH. As a result grazing 
pressure increases as less HH are forced out of production. This effect is partially 
compensated by a reduction in herd sizes of richer HH. The ecosystem reaction in 
terms of increased degradation towards the net increase is moderate. The coupled 
SES was able to cope with and to internalize the change in exogenous 
subsidization.
4.6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss general insights from our modelling endeavour.  We 
found that the SES is resilient towards droughts but that droughts accelerate 
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structural change in the village. A loss of social embededdness du to an increased 
share of absentee herders leads to the disintegration of resilience on all scales. 
Finally, the introduction of a basic income grant alongside with other anti-poverty 
measures does not jeopardize SES resilience but ends the erosion of HH 
resilience. Next to the directly derived results from our experiments we want to 
discuss the lessons learned during our modelling exercise. 
The presented modelling approach made an attempt to address three major 
challenges for the fairly new interdisciplinary field of SES modelling: (1) to get 
the context right, (2) to arrive at quantifiable measures of resilience on multiple 
scales and to (3) account for endogenous institutional processes. 
The first objective was achieved by combining empirical agent based with bio-
physical modelling. Here, empirical case study data from surveys, anthropologic 
field observation, soil and vegetation samples was used. We found that 
interdisciplinary research is an unavoidable pre-requisite for building structurally 
realistic SES models with the aim to reflect the fundamental processes and 
contexts of a specific case. In our view, a single discipline is simply not able to 
sufficiently cover, or even understand, the social and the ecological dimensions of 
the coupled system. 
A key finding resulting from quantifying multi-scale resilience is the insight that 
resiliencies within the same SES can diverge or converge over different scales. 
This perspective underpins the importance to avoid the trap of utilizing the 
resilience concept in a strictly normative way. That is, to include the scale 
perspective within the boundaries of the SES constitutes a meta-normative 
approach. Here, resilience is not an isolated end-result which has to be achieved 
by all means but must be treated as an endogenous process cascading over 
multiple scales of the system. Desirability is relative.  The impact of three 
different shocks on the SES results in contrasting dynamics on the ecosystem, 
HH, social and SES scale. However, a severe loss of resilience on all scales is 
only observed in a scenario mimicking the loss of social embededdness resulting 
in institutional collapse. The latter observation stresses the important role of 
endogenous institutions in SES modelling which has not seen much attention in 
the literature so far. Here, the strand of computational studies of norms is a 
promising field to be considered for SES modelling. 
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Accordingly, limitations for structurally realistic SES modelling with a resilience 
focus are:
1. costs - associated with interdisciplinary research as well as extensive data 
requirements
2. complexity - necessity to identify relevant scales and to analyze parallel 
resilience dynamics
3. innovation - needed to further develop a methodology for representing 
endogenous institutional processes
Looking forward, there is the need to deal with a principle dilemma associated 
with the modelling approach presented in this chapter: the identification of clear 
causal relationships between individual model components and system outcomes. 
Model parameters increase with complexity in a non-linear fashion prohibiting a 
comprehensive sensitivity analysis. The inherent trade-off between accounting for 
socio-ecological complexity and full understanding of model behaviour
constitutes a limitation. While our model gained from acknowledging socio-
ecological complexity in terms of structural realism needed to measure multi-
scale resilience, it also lacks transparency due to its increased parameter space. It 
might be worth, at least in our view, to aim at an intermediate level of complexity 
in order to advance the field of SES modelling.
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Appendix A: Links to online appendix 
Template HH survey – Livestock owners http://www.fg1501db.uni-koeln.de/index.php?navi=8&id=16
Coding scheme HH survey – Livestock owners http://www.fg1501db.uni-koeln.de/index.php?navi=8&id=36
Data HH survey – Livestock owners http://www.fg1501db.uni-koeln.de/index.php?navi=8&id=37
Input data file – Livestock owners http://www.fg1501db.uni-koeln.de/index.php?navi=8&id=43
Template HH survey – HH not owning livestock http://www.fg1501db.uni-koeln.de/index.php?navi=8&id=17
Coding scheme HH survey – HH not owning livestock http://www.fg1501db.uni-koeln.de/index.php?navi=8&id=38
Data HH survey – HH not owning livestock http://www.fg1501db.uni-koeln.de/index.php?navi=8&id=44
Weather file
Extended figure of rangeland submodel
Parameter input file rangeland submodel
http://www.fg1501db.uni-koeln.de/index.php?navi=8&id=42
http://www.fg1501db.uni-koeln.de/index.php?navi=8&id=45
http://www.fg1501db.uni-koeln.de/index.php?navi=8&id=46
